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A Philosophical Objection to the
Optimal Tax Model
LINDA SUGIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most intractable problem in tax design has long been the con-
flict between equity and efficiency. A tax system should be fair, and it
should seek to raise the maximum revenue with the minimum cost. In
economic theory, fairness is about the distribution of the tax burden
and efficiency is about the social costs of raising revenue.' The prob-
lem is that a tax that distributes the burden in a desirable way may
simultaneously impose costs. For example, a tax that collects more
from the rich than the poor may be distributionally fair, but it may
also discourage the rich from earning, reducing overall productivity.
The perennial challenge for tax policymakers is managing these trade-
offs.
The theory of optimal taxation is the most important twentieth-cen-
tury development in tax policy analysis because it provides mathemat-
ical tools for determining a desirable tax by balancing equity against
efficiency.2 Users of the model can input various patterns of income
distribution and efficiency costs of taxation to evaluate alternative tax
regimes. The model is amenable to different definitions of distribu-
tional fairness and can adjust to accommodate specific limitations in
tax design that may arise from political or administrative constraints.
Because of the model's wide range and flexibility, the optimal tax
literature is extensive, and offers insights on many fundamental tax
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I appreciate the many helpful
comments of the participants of the University of Pennsylvania Tax Policy Colloquium,
Oxford University Foundation for Law, Justice and Society Conference on Taxation and
the Social Contract, the University of Connecticut Tax Policy Lecture Series, the Loyola
LA Law School Faculty Workshop, and the Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop. I am
also grateful to Noel Cunningham, Bill Eskridge, Tracy Higgins, Michael Knoll, Marjorie
Kornhauser, Ruth Mason, Katie Pratt, Chris Sanchirico, Reed Shuldiner, Nancy Staudt,
and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 323 (5th ed. 1999).
2 See generally J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxa-
tion, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971).
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policy issues, including the two most paradigmatic-progressivity 3 and
choice of tax base. 4
The optimal income tax model was developed by economist James
Mirrlees for the purpose of determining how progressive an income
tax should be if the system's goal is maximization of social welfare.5
His work was groundbreaking because it offered a way to derive a
particular tax rate schedule from equity and efficiency concerns, re-
placing a vague intuition in the economics literature that progressive
taxation would increase social welfare.6 The model was named "opti-
mal" for a reason-twenty years ago, a leading economist called opti-
mal tax theory "the reigning normative approach to taxation."7
While the optimal income tax model surely deserves its central
place in the literature, there is an assumption underlying it that has
not been fully considered in evaluating its normative authority and its
capacity to produce a truly optimal tax scheme in practice. Mirrlees
assumed that taxation should be based on "a man's income-earning
potential," and that "the most reliable indicator of his income-earning
potential is his income."8 Thus, Mirrlees used actual income as a
proxy for a person's ability to earn on the dual assumptions that (1)
ability to earn or earning potential-what is often called "endow-
ment" in the literature-is ideally what we want to tax,9 and (2) a
person generally earns as much as he is potentially able to earn. Mir-
rlees proceeded to design his model using actual earned income as a
discernible, though inexact, substitute for one's ability to earn. 10
This Article questions the normative power of the optimal tax
model by examining Mirrlees' dual assumptions. It makes a case for
moving beyond utilitarian conceptions of social welfare that are at the
foundation of the optimal tax model, and that have become the domi-
nant construct in tax policy analysis. In explaining why the Mirrlees
3 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:
A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1905, 1964-65 (1987); Lawrence
Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Anal-
ysis?, 53 Tax L. Rev. 51 (1999).
4 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consump-
tion Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413 (2006).
5 Mirrlees, note 2.
6 Id. at 175. The analysis is a proof with over 100 equations, and it comes to the surpris-
ing conclusion that the optimum is not steeply progressive at all. See id. at 202-04 (rate
tables).
7 Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. Econ. Persp. 157, 157
(1990).
8 Mirrlees, note 2, at 175 (internal punctuation mark omitted).
9 This Article uses "endowment tax" and "ability tax" interchangeably to refer to Mir-
rlees' ideal.
10 Mirrlees, note 2, at 175. The Mirrlees model further simplifies by assuming that all
income is from labor. Id. at 176.
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assumptions are problematic, the Article argues for a nuanced, philo-
sophical understanding of fairness that incorporates the role of taxa-
tion into a broader conception of a just society. A fair tax must satisfy
the full range of demands that a just society places on government
exercising its coercive power over individuals. Applying that philo-
sophical approach to tax fairness reveals significant deficiencies in the
assumption that a tax on ability to earn is truly optimal as a matter of
justice.
The Article proceeds as follows. The next Part explores why the
Mirrlees ideal is attractive to economists, and expresses skepticism
about the economic analysis on its own terms. Part III introduces the
legal literature and describes why ability taxation has been attractive
to those who care about fairness in taxation. It shifts the focus to
fairness in political theory, contending that fairness in taxation must
be understood as a conception of equality." It critiques endowment
taxation as an ideal on those terms, arguing that endowment tells us
much less about inequality among individuals than we might hope; the
proponents of ability taxation have misunderstood the nature of lib-
erty and equality essential to liberal egalitarian political theory. The
Article concludes by considering why the discussion about inequality
in taxation has focused on human endowment rather than financial
endowment, and suggests a way forward for breaking out of the utili-
tarian mold and using a philosophical conception of fairness more
broadly in thinking about justice in taxation.
II. EXAMINING THE ECONOMIST'S IDEAL
The endowment tax ideal originated with economists and grew out
of their belief that the best way to design a tax system is to raise reve-
nue with the fewest possible distortions.12 Economists use an econ-
omy with lump sum taxation as the baseline because it allows the
market to operate freely.13 Lump sum taxes are those that do not
change as a result of taxpayer behavior. A head tax is the prime ex-
ample because it is levied on account of mere existence. Because a
head tax is due in a fixed and equal amount no matter a person's fi-
nancial circumstance, it strikes most people as fundamentally unfair
11 This approach is just starting to show life in the tax policy literature. See James R.
Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 Vand. L. Rev.
1129 (2008).
12 See David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 174-76 (1986).
13 See Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Debate
over Taxes 121 (3d ed. 2004).
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and arbitrary. 1 4 Some people cannot afford a head tax no matter how
hard they try, while others can pay it with no discernible sacrifice.15
The ideal tax in the optimal tax model, an endowment tax, is a lump
sum tax that seems to overcome the distributional objections to head
taxes. It is lump sum because it cannot be avoided by changing behav-
ior, so it is efficient in the economists' sense. It also seems fairer and
less arbitrary than a head tax because people who would have an eas-
ier time earning more money are required to pay more tax.16 It is
attractive because it appears both efficient (in the economist's sense
of not distorting behavior) and equitable (because it is sensitive to
differing abilities to pay).
Endowment taxation also has an appealing neutrality connected to
its economic efficiency. It is indifferent to choices that people make;
the tax remains fixed whether a person chooses more work or more
leisure, higher- or lower-paying work. This is where Mirrlees' second
assumption becomes crucial because ability taxation is a neutral base-
line, free of distortions, only if people actually maximize earnings.
Mirrlees assumed that they do maximize when he designed the model
to use actual earnings as the proxy for ability to earn. 17 Without the
assumption that individuals maximize earnings, distortions reappear,
and taxation based on ability can affect many choices. Because a
lump sum tax requires that individuals earn at least enough money
income to pay the tax, a lump sum tax distorts the decisions of an
individual who would maximize nonmarket activities in the absence of
the tax. By relaxing Mirrlees' assumption that individuals always
maximize earnings, it becomes clear that his ideal tax on potential
earnings can produce a significant behavioral effect by incentivizing
14 A head tax, or poll tax, was reportedly a cause of the downfall of Margaret Thatcher's
government in England. See Peter Passell, Furor over British Poll Tax Imperils Thatcher
Ideology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1990, at D1; see also Slemrod & Bakija, note 13, at 55. The
tax policy literature is largely devoid of head tax proponents. One defense is Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for
Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 221, 270-71 (1995).
15 In one of the classic works on tax justice, John Stuart Mill defined a fair tax as one
that produced equal sacrifice. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy bk. V, ch.
II § 2 (Prometheus Books 2004) (1848). ("Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of
politics, means equality of sacrifice. It means apportioning the contribution of each person
towards the expenses of government so that he shall feel neither more nor less inconve-
nience from his share of the payment than every other person experiences from his.")
16 Daniel Shaviro has argued that an endowment tax may be the best understanding of
the well-established ability-to-pay norm. Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in
Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate 123, 125 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr.
eds., 2002).
17 Mirrlees, note 2, at 200-07; cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Progressivity and Potential
Income: Measuring the Effect of Changing Work Patterns on Income Tax Progressivity,
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1551 (2008) (assuming that people modify their hours, but not their
wage rates).
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individuals to maximize earnings. Thus, the economic approach that
incorporates lump sum taxation as a neutral baseline contains an un-
stated normative bias in favor of earnings maximization. That bias has
become part of every analysis that compares alternative tax systems
pursuant to the optimal tax model.
The economists' efficiency criterion concentrates on distortions that
are caused by people changing their behavior to avoid tax. For exam-
ple, a tax on oranges might cause people to eat more apples and fewer
oranges. But if they really like oranges better than apples, the tax
makes them worse off without bringing in any revenue, producing
what economists call "deadweight loss."" That loss arises from the
"substitution effect," 19 which is concerned with how people change
their behavior to avoid a tax, such as eating more apples and fewer
oranges. The substitution effect present in an income tax that makes
endowment taxation attractive is the substitution of leisure for work;20
in an endowment tax one cannot avoid tax by working less.21 The
easier it is to avoid tax by substituting nontaxed activities, the more
distortion the tax produces. This is why broader-based taxes are more
efficient;22 a tax on all fruit (or all food or all purchases) produces less
distortion than one imposed only on oranges. The economist's judg-
ment of the efficiency of a tax focuses on substitution effects, since
only substitution effects produce deadweight loss. 23 A major objec-
tive of tax design is minimizing deadweight loss.
Substitution effects are troublesome, but they are not the only dis-
tortions produced by taxation. Those distortions depend on "income
effects" in addition to substitution effects. 24 Income effects look at
how people manage their income in response to a tax. For example,
an orange lover might earn more money to afford the expensive or-
anges that he craves. An income tax may cause people to work more
so they have the same after-tax income they would have had in the
absence of the tax.25 From the perspective of the income effect, there
18 Deadweight loss is the social cost of taxation that produces no revenue. See Richard
Musgrave & Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 235-36 (5th ed. 1989).
19 Id. at 299.
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 Duke L.J. 1145, 1149-53 (2006).
22 See Bradford, note 12, at 174-76; Bankman & Weisbach, note 4, at 1420-21.
23 I am grateful to Chris Sanchirico for helping me work out this analysis.
24 See generally Laurie L. Malman, Linda F. Sugin, Lewis D. Solomon & Jerome M.
Hesch, The Individual Tax Base: Cases, Problems, and Policies in Federal Taxation 9
(2002).
25 Non-income-based taxes also have income effects. For example, a tax on consump-
tion might encourage greater earning to maintain after-tax levels of consumption. Imposi-
tion of a wealth tax might encourage greater earning to achieve set levels of wealth
accumulation, while a reduction in wealth taxes might reduce levels of earnings.
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is no advantage to endowment taxation compared to income taxation,
and income taxation may even be preferable.
The centrality of deadweight loss and substitution effects in the effi-
ciency analysis of taxation downplays the real importance of income
effects to individuals making choices in their lives. If economists fo-
cused more on income effects and how they distort behavior, ability
taxation might not seem optimal at all, even from an efficiency per-
spective. An endowment tax has no substitution effect-and no dead-
weight loss-because a person cannot change her behavior to avoid
the tax. There can be no social cost incurred in avoiding the tax where
it is not possible to avoid the tax. But there is social cost in being
required to pay an endowment tax, even if that cost does not appear
in the economic model.26 An ability tax has a very powerful income
effect because a person is likely to increase her income to cover the
costs of the tax and her other needs.
All taxes have income effects since all taxes are payable in money
that needs to come from somewhere. It is, therefore, tempting to dis-
regard them when considering alternative taxes. 27 Nevertheless, large
income effects should be important in measuring the overall distortion
produced by a tax, and should not be ignored when comparing alter-
native systems with different distorting effects. 28 Income effects may
be more likely than substitution effects to reduce individual well-being
because people who substitute leisure for work may be happier for
having more leisure, 29 while people who work more to cover the tax
have no offsetting welfare gain from that choice. Given the utility
gains from substituting leisure for work, it is surprising that the litera-
ture is so focused on the substitution effect.30
26 Such a tax may distort an individual's choices in ways that are not categorized as loss
of either consumer or producer surplus, the identified losses in the economic model. See
Mirrlees, note 2, at 178-80 (introducing shadow rates for consumption and labor to the
model); see also Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 65-81 (2009) (relating
consumer and producer surplus to the elasticity of demand and discussing the Mirrlees
model); see generally Anthony Vitarelli, Happiness Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27
Yale J. on Reg. 115, 125-27 (2010) (discussing consumer and producer surplus as well as
shadow pricing in the context of government rulemaking).
27 The tax literature often focuses on substitution effects. Arguments in favor of low
rates, for example, are based on concerns over the substitution effect. See 1 Treasury
Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 13 (1984).
28 One exception to the general disregard of income effects in the tax literature is Mar-
tin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for
Progressive Taxation, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 43-45 (1998) (analyzing the income effect for
lower-income taxpayers compared to the substitution effect for high-income taxpayers).
29 See Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1363,
1391 (2004).
30 The Mirrlees model assumes a very high elasticity of substitution, which has been
questioned. See Bankman & Griffith, note 3, at 1964-65.
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While all taxes produce some income effect, it would be a mistake
to ignore income effects as an evil that is the same for all taxes. The
magnitude of the income effect differs; a tax that makes a person work
a few additional hours is considerably less distortionary than a tax that
forecloses an individual's choice of occupation. On these terms, an
endowment tax is particularly troubling. Consider an investment
banker and a disaster-relief worker with equal abilities. In a world
without taxes,31 each could have chosen the other's profession. If one
makes $1 million and the other $40,000, the optimal tax model treats
them the same, since they each could have chosen the other's work.
But the imposition of an endowment tax drastically changes their rela-
tive positions. Whereas they may have had equivalent welfare before
imposition of a tax, a $30,000 tax (calculated at 3% of a $1 million
endowment) leaves the relief worker with a tremendous reduction in
welfare, while the investment banker suffers only a small reduction.
After tax, they are in very different positions because now the relief
worker, even if she cares much less about money than the investment
banker when she makes $40,000, has so little that she is unlikely to
cover her basic needs. If the tax rate-while still low-is 5% of en-
dowment, the relief worker must choose other work-her choice is
foreclosed by her high ability to earn. Thus, the endowment tax
clearly distorts the choices of the high-ability individual in favor of
higher-paying market work. Nevertheless, the tax produces no dead-
weight loss.
When comparing an ability tax with any other possible tax, the rela-
tive distortions must be considered, and the total resulting distortions,
as well as their character, are important. For example, an endowment
tax is significantly more distortionary than is a head tax, although as
lump sum taxes neither produces deadweight loss. That is because an
endowment tax is much more likely to encourage individuals to maxi-
mize their earnings-producing a greater income effect. A head tax
would make everyone work some, but an endowment tax would re-
quire that the exceptionally able work significantly more than every-
31 In judging the efficiency of alternative tax bases beyond lump sum taxes, one can
compare relative distortions without any reference baseline at all. An income tax has both
income and substitution effects, but the total distortions could be smaller or less troubling
than the income effects alone of an endowment tax. That determination depends on whose
behavior is distorted and how the distortions affect different people's welfare. Since a no-
tax world is not a viable option, it is generally not a helpful baseline in thinking about tax
policy. In this case, however, it may be helpful to think about the distortion question
against the baseline of a no-tax world because the endowment tax inquiry is an attempt to
identify an ideal. Moreover, in comparing alternatives, the issue is identifying not only the
magnitude but also the nature of the distortions. In deciding among tax systems, we may
want to choose the system that minimizes the most troubling distortions, rather than the
largest ones.
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one else since their tax would be much higher, particularly if the tax
has graduated rates.
Compare the relative distortions of an endowment tax with an in-
come tax. The income effect in an income tax (increased work to
achieve a set level of after-tax wage) is tempered by the offsetting
substitution effect (decreased work on account of avoiding the tax by
choosing leisure instead of work) so that the two distortions together
might add up to less than either one separately. 32 Since the substitu-
tion effect would be absent in an endowment tax, the effective distor-
tion produced by the income effect would be bigger than in an income
tax. An endowment tax would likely produce even more lawyers and
bankers than does our current system. It is puzzling that economists
treat a tax with such a strong income effect as a neutral baseline sim-
ply because it produces no deadweight loss, even though the overall
distortions it can produce are so significant.
From a social policy perspective, the economists' approach is troub-
ling. As this analysis of the income effect shows, choosing ability taxa-
tion over other taxes because it is more efficient privileges some
distortions over others and interferes with social values apart from
efficiency. In the economic approach, distorting the choice of one's
occupation is considered less significant than distorting the labor/lei-
sure choice. A comparison of taxes must consider both the degree
and the nature of the distortions produced by each tax. The choice
between income or consumption tax, on the one hand, and endow-
ment tax, on the other, involves deciding which distortions to tolerate:
more versus less work under an income or consumption tax, or occu-
pation A versus occupation B under an endowment tax.3 3
While economists may be most concerned with taxpayers changing
their behavior to avoid tax, others may consider distortions that affect
fundamental life decisions, like the choice of occupation, to be more
important for evaluating justice in taxation. It is not necessary for the
choice of occupation to be reduced to just one for the decision to be
fundamentally distorted by the tax. 3 4 Comparing the labor/leisure
32 This is a well-known aspect of the theory of second best. See generally R.G. Lipsey &
Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956).
33 While an income tax also might affect the choice of occupation, the offsetting income
and substitution effects would be part of that calculation, and the occupation chosen would
affect the tax liability, so we might expect an endowment tax to be a much more significant
factor in that decision.
34 The debate on endowment taxation has taken the unfortunate turn of arguing about
just how restrictive the endowment tax would be. See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The
Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 123 (2002) (arguing the problem with endowment
taxation is not merely that it limits a person's career choices, but that it may leave them
with only one career choice); Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts
on the Liberty Objections to Endowment Taxation, 18 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 47, 48-49
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choice with the choice of occupation highlights the importance of the
latter choice compared to the former. The choice of occupation is
central to individual autonomy; it is something that individuals need
to do to assert their personal identity. This is why the free choice of
occupation is included in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights35 and the European Union Constitution,36 as well as the liberal
egalitarian understanding of justice. 37 The choice of a little more or
less work seems a smaller and less important distortion for the tax
system to impose. From an individual autonomy perspective, the la-
bor/leisure distortion is not very troubling. Thus, the "neutrality" in
the efficiency of the endowment tax is a false one because it treads so
heavily on one of the central decisions in a person's life.
III. TAXATION AND EQUALITY: REFRAMING THE DEBATE
IN PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
Compared to economists, lawyers and legal theorists traditionally
have not been enamored with endowment taxation. It is impracti-
cal-if not impossible-to collect tax based on something that cannot
be observed, so it is not a tax capable of implementation. In addition,
some legal scholars have been repelled by an ability tax because it
challenges intuitive notions of liberty and autonomy.38
Nevertheless, some legal thinkers have become increasingly drawn
to the endowment tax ideal as a model for designing an actual tax
system.39 Unlike economists, who are drawn to endowment taxation
on efficiency grounds, legal scholars have started to defend it on eq-
(2005) (refuting arguments that the limitations on personal autonomy are the same for an
endowment tax and an earnings tax). My argument here (and below, see Part V) is equally
compelling even if there is only one choice that is foreclosed.
35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. AIRes/
217(111), at 75 (Dec. 10, 1948).
36 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 11-75, opened for signature Nov.
11, 2004,2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (rejected by France and Netherlands in 2005, unimplemented)
("Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted at
occupation.").
37 John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Collected Papers 359, 366 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999) ("[F]ree choice of occupation ... [is] required for the pursuit of final
ends as well as to give effect to a decision to revise and change them, if one so desires.").
38 See Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
"Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev.
831, 841-44 (1979) (contending the fundamental flaw in an ability tax is that a tax system
ought not to force people into the market).
39 See, e.g., Shaviro, note 16, at 144 (arguing the endowment tax model helps clarify
real-world tax policy debates and decisions); Stark, note 34, at 65-57 (using the endowment
tax as a means to evaluate the current tax base and considering the earned income tax
credit as a leisure tax); Zelenak, note 21, at 1172-81 (evaluating proposals to partially im-
plement an endowment tax).
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uity grounds.40 For those who believe that the project of tax policy
should be devising a just tax scheme, the search for an ideal measure
of distributive justice is an important starting point in the search for a
just tax. Serious consideration of taxation based on ability to earn is a
positive development in the legal literature because it reflects a search
for fundamental principles of fairness, and engages both economists
and legal thinkers in a dialogue on issues of taxation that concern both
groups. Even if everyone agrees that a tax is impractical and impossi-
ble to administer, it should still be examined if it embodies the ulti-
mate measure of fairness in taxation. If it is the best ideal, then actual
tax systems should be evaluated against it.
Taxation according to potential to earn is alluring to those con-
cerned with distributional fairness because it imposes more tax on
people with greater abilities than those with lesser abilities. Ability to
earn must correlate with ability to pay tax; two people who earn the
same income are not equally able to pay tax if one had to work much
longer or harder than the other to earn the income. Those with
greater abilities to earn have more choices and can choose leisure over
work without giving up as much in material goods. This is the ap-
proach taken by Daniel Shaviro, who argued that taxation based on
ability to earn should be embraced-with some reservations-by both
utilitarians, who define fairness by maximizing social welfare, 41 and
liberal egalitarians, who define fairness with reference to protecting
certain rights and liberties.42 He claimed that ability taxation captures
the equality norm driving both the utilitarian and liberal egalitarian
conceptions of fairness. 43 In this way, Shaviro follows one of the dom-
inant approaches of contemporary political thought in interpreting di-
verse political theories as competing in their various interpretations of
a shared equality norm." Other legal scholars have supported ability
taxation on fairness grounds as well, to a greater 45 or lesser 46 extent.
40 See, e.g., Shaviro, note 16, at 125-32 (arguing endowment is the best underlying mea-
sure of inequality).
41 Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 51.
42 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 50 (1990).
43 Shaviro, note 16, at 143-44.
44 See generally Kymlicka, note 42 (evaluating competing theories of a just society).
45 Kirk Stark proceeded even further than Shaviro to argue that endowment taxation
best implements the interpretation of liberty in liberal egalitarian political thought, making
it an attractive ideal in those terms. Stark, note 34, at 65-66. He claims that liberal egal-
itarians have no principled difference with libertarians on the centrality of individual
choice to justice, so that liberal egalitarians, like libertarians, must either reject all taxation
as interference with rights as libertarians do, or must accept endowment taxation along
with income and consumption taxation. Id. at 67-68. For a comparison of libertarian and
liberal egalitarian approaches, see Section V.B.
46 David Hasen, while rejecting endowment taxation for the purpose of redistributing
resources, accepts it as a legitimate means of financing public goods under liberal social
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This Article now turns more fully to engaging the equity arguments
for endowment taxation. It argues that those who have embraced en-
dowment taxation on liberal egalitarian grounds have misunderstood
the demands of those political theories and the meaning of fairness
that they embody. By undertaking a rigorous analysis of liberal egali-
tarian theories, this Article explains why endowment taxation fails to
fulfill the equality norm that motivates liberal egalitarian thinkers. It
explains that equality is not a matter of wage rates, as an endowment
tax implies, but of designing institutions that guarantee equal concern
and respect for everyone. Each individual is entitled to develop her
own conception of a meaningful life. Political institutions, such as the
tax system, must be part of that design.
On those terms, endowment taxation fails to deliver by denying
both the highly endowed and the less endowed their due: The highly
endowed are constrained in their ability to determine their life plans,
while the poorly-endowed are the subject of societal pity and stripped
of their self-respect. Allowing governments to define individuals in
terms of their endowments adopts too spare a view of what a person is
and therefore misunderstands why every person is entitled to equal
respect and concern. An endowment tax elevates fate above free will,
and returns our public institutions to the days of status over merit. It
levels people down for equality. It reflects the antithesis of justice.
A. Utilitarian, Libertarian, and Liberal Egalitarian Approaches
to Equality in Taxation
The current debate over justice in taxation reflects a tension be-
tween utilitarianism and deontological, nonconsequentialist political
theories,47 even though both approaches can be understood to strive
for equality in taxation. Utilitarianism treats individuals equally by
counting everyone's preferences the same. Liberal egalitarians treat
individuals equally by requiring that institutions afford them equal re-
spect and concern; nonconsequentialists are generally concerned with
rights. A utilitarian tax system is one that contributes most to maxi-
mizing along a single dimension of outcomes. Utilitarians have had
the upper hand in the tax policy literature for quite some time because
their arguments sound in a combination of fairness and efficiency, and
contract theories. David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1057,
1061-62 (2007). Hasen is quite critical of the endowment tax, arguing that it generally fails
the test of Pareto superiority underlying social contractarian political theory. Id. at 1098.
But he employs a benefits taxation analysis to conclude that there are situations in which
endowment taxation would be an acceptable liberal social institution. Id. at 1092-93.
47 See Joseph Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership,
and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 Tax L. Rev. 399, 407-10 (2005) (comparing utilitarianism
and deontological liberalism as theories of social justice).
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resonate as specific and determinative. To the contrary, nonconse-
quentialist theories have had less influence in the literature because
they are less likely to produce specific results.48 A utilitarian tax
scheme might resemble a system predicated on rights, but there is no
intrinsic reason why it should. Failure to distinguish utilitarian, liberal
egalitarian, and libertarian justifications from each other has produced
significant confusion in the discussion of tax fairness. By explicitly
grounding its analysis in political theory, this Article attempts to im-
prove the clarity of the discussion.
Both utilitarian and deontological approaches can claim to offer
standards for justice in taxation, and it is not the goal of this Article to
convince readers that nonconsequentialist theories are more compel-
ling than utilitarian ones. Instead, this Article parses nonconsequen-
tialist theories in order to identify how they differ in their approach to
just taxation, and to explain why the economist's ideal tax on ability to
earn fails to carry out the ideals of any of the leading theories. It
distinguishes the libertarian approach of Robert Nozick from other
nonconsequentialist theories to argue that Nozick's objections to all
taxation differ fundamentally from the objections that John Rawls and
Ronald Dworkin would have to endowment taxation in particular. It
also distinguishes the conceptions of distributive justice espoused by
Rawls and Dworkin because different ideas that have shared the "lib-
eral egalitarian" label in the tax policy literature require different
analyses of the endowment tax ideal. Before delving into the specific
critiques, it may be helpful to review where the debate on the justice
of ability taxation has been.
The seeds of the contemporary debate on ability taxation were
planted in the legal literature by Mark Kelman in 1979, who argued
that justice required that a distinction be made between market and
nonmarket production. 49 He offered a theory of implied consent in
which the decision to go into the market and earn money represents
consent to taxation by the state, but that private nonmarket produc-
tion should be beyond the reach of taxation.50 Although his central
concern was crafting a normative justification for deducting charitable
contributions and medical expenses in an income tax,51 his approach
also forecloses an endowment tax because it taxes nonmarket
benefits.5 2
48 See Repetti, note 11, at 1130-31 (noting that part of the difficulty in comparing effi-
ciency and equity benefits is because of the difficulty in measuring equity benefits).
49 Kelman, note 38, at 840-42.
50 Id. at 842.
51 Id. at 831-34.
52 Id. at 842-44.
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Shaviro explicitly rejects Kelman's framework distinguishing mar-
ket and nonmarket production.53 Considering endowment taxation
more directly than Kelman did, Shaviro explores the fundamental dis-
tributional concern underlying the choice of tax base. 54 Where his
framework is utilitarian, his intuition is that tax bases are attempting
to differentiate levels of welfare. He considers what makes one per-
son better off than another, and concludes that individuals with higher
wage rates are categorically better off than those with lower wage
rates because a person with a higher wage rate has more choices.55
This is so no matter what each actually earns because if a high-wage
individual chooses leisure over work, it must be because he values the
leisure more than the money he would earn from choosing to work.56
Shaviro argues that a system with a goal of taxing those who are
better off more heavily than those who are less well- off should be
concerned with wage rates rather than actual wages.57 This reasoning
treats wage rate as a good proxy for utility because it defines the limits
of a person's ability to choose, which translates to his welfare. A
lesser-endowed individual has fewer choices and is therefore not so
well-off. Shaviro argues that a tax on earnings is precisely the wrong
solution in a world with unequal wage rates because a person with a
higher wage rate but lower earnings is better off than someone with a
lower wage rate and higher earnings on account of the welfare-maxi-
mizing choices they are presumed to make.58 An income tax increases
that inequality by taxing the worse-off person more than the person
with greater welfare and less cash.59 Thus, an income tax is unjust on
these terms. Shaviro tempers his enthusiasm for endowment taxation
in his utilitarian analysis by considering varying levels of work aver-
sion60 and "'lumpy' labor market[s]." 61 On account of these complica-
tions to the basic model, Shaviro ultimately concludes that there is no
clear utilitarian justification for an endowment tax.62
53 Shaviro, note 16, at 133-34.
54 Id. at 124.
55 Id. at 127-31. Differences in taste are not relevant for distributional consequences.
Id. at 123.
56 Id. at 130-31.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 137. A more recent contribution to the endowment tax debate treats the differ-
ences in utility associated with labor effort as particularly important. See Zelenak, note 21,
at 1165-69.
61 Shaviro, note 16, at 137-38.
62 Id. at 139-40. Even though endowment might provide a good measure of inequality,
he concludes that taxing it may not be the best way to achieve a welfarist distributional
policy because translating endowment into welfare in the real world is trickier than in the
ideal. Id.
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Turning from utilitarianism, Shaviro argues that an ability tax
should appeal to nonconsequentialists. 63 He suggests that the liberal
egalitarian case for endowment taxation is stronger than the utilitarian
case because liberal egalitarians place value on allowing people to
choose what they want, for its own sake, rather than as an instrument
for achieving something else."6 Endowment distinguishes a person's
circumstances from his choices, 65 and liberal egalitarians are "not con-
cerned with the welfare content of outcomes," but rather with their
entitlement to resources or opportunities, for which endowment is a
good measure.66 Thus, high-endowment individuals are better off be-
cause they have more opportunities than individuals with lower en-
dowments. Thus, Shaviro's liberal egalitarian analysis is structured in
utilitarian terms.
Stark makes a more radical claim than does Shaviro about deonto-
logical theories and endowment taxation. He compares liberal egali-
tarian objections to endowment taxation with libertarian objections,
explaining that his project is to question whether liberal egalitarian
"opponents of endowment taxation can distinguish their liberty objec-
tions from Nozick's claim that taxation of earnings is on a par with
forced labor." 67 He concludes that they cannot-that liberal egalitari-
ans either must accept Nozick's liberty objections to all forms of taxa-
tion, or concede that there are none.68 The line that liberal
egalitarians draw between endowment taxation on one side and in-
come and consumption taxes on the other is unprincipled. He argues
that "by offering greater liberty protection to [nonmarket activities],
the liberal egalitarian is assigning greater moral worth to those activi-
ties" which is inconsistent with "the liberal commitment to neutrality
among alternative visions of the good life." 69 For Stark, the market is
a value-neutral, apolitical baseline, and nonmarket activities are val-
ued at the opportunity cost of wage work. Like Shaviro, Stark focuses
on the importance of individual choice within the liberal egalitarian
framework. And like Shaviro, Stark misunderstands the liberal egali-
tarian project and its lessons for fair taxation.
63 Id. at 142-43.
6 Id. at 141-42.
65 Id. at 140-41. There is a substantial philosophical literature exploring this question.
See, e.g., Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (1991); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2:
Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283 (1981). Some commentators do not believe
that the dichotomy is a useful way to think about distributive justice. See notes 137-41 and
accompanying text.
66 Shaviro, note 16, at 140.
67 Stark, note 34, at 49.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 65.
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In their survey of the issues of justice raised by taxation, Liam Mur-
phy and Thomas Nagel rejected endowment taxation as too much in-
terference with individual autonomy, though not a unique type of
interference. 70 They identified autonomy concerns with both endow-
ment taxation and income taxation, but concluded that the intrusion
on autonomy in income taxation was small enough to balance accepta-
bly against the need to fund the state. They were concerned that an
endowment tax may leave a person with only one choice in life.71 The
function of autonomy in the political theories with which Murphy and
Nagel were concerned is to foster moral agency. In promoting moral
agency, it is important to guarantee individual self-respect 72 and allow
that "the principles of [a person's] action are chosen by him as the
most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal
rational being."73 Autonomy is a part of freedom understood as the
moral power to have a conception of the good and the power to
change that conception.74 Contrary to the premise underlying endow-
ment taxation, in which you are defined by your endowment, auton-
omy means "freedom from the determination of our choices by
'natural contingencies and social accident." 75 It does not require
equalizing potential across individuals.
B. Let the Beachcomber Drown
The discussion about endowment taxation has taken an unfortunate
turn by focusing on beachcombers, a paradigm that implicitly rejects
the central project of liberal egalitarian political theory-how to allo-
cate the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. 76 The beach-
70 Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 122-25.
71 Id. at 123.
72 Rawls states that the most important primary good is self-respect. "[I]t includes a
person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his
plan of life, is worth carrying out." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 440 (1971).
73 Id. at 252.
74 John Rawls, Political Liberalism 30 (1993).
75 Robert S. Taylor, Rawls's Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruc-
tion, 31 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 246, 256 (2003).
76 1 have heard the following hypothetical raised by those who would accept an endow-
ment tax: If there are two people in a society and one is incapable of productive work,
while the other is disinclined to work, is it just to tax the lazy one on his endowment to
prevent them both from starving? It is a curious hypothetical that asks whether the state
(Is that what it is in a two-person society?) can compel its citizens to work at all, under any
circumstances. But it does not seem quite to fit the issues presented by an endowment tax,
and it fails to challenge the Rawlsian rejection of endowment taxation because it is beyond
the scope of Rawls' analysis. Rawls explains that basic needs must be fulfilled before the
first principle is even applied-the priority of liberty assumes that people can enter into
society. Rawls, note 37, at 365. "[T]he Priority of Liberty would be meaningless in a soci-
ety that could not even establish the basic liberties themselves due to social and economic
conditions." Taylor, note 75, at 263. He explains, "we start by assuming that citizens are
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comber opts out of the cooperative project, and the beachcomber
paradigm accepts the notion of atomistic individuals, rather than in-
terrelated social functioning.77 Beachcombers who have truly opted
out of civilized society are too scarce to care about. And even if they
were more common, why should they be relevant to the question of
society's ordering, given that they are not part of it?78 The beach-
comber paradigm suggests that resources are plentiful enough and
available in a way that starvation is not a problem, even for those who
choose not to participate in society. The interesting question about
the beachcomber is not whether he should be obligated to contribute
anything to society, as an endowment tax would require, but whether
society has any obligation to prevent him from starving if he does not.
Taxation has nothing to say about the latter question, and social con-
tract theories generally do not extend beyond the bounds of society.
Remaining a participant in society distinguishes the potential taxpayer
from the beachcomber. Volunteers, homemakers,79 and low-wage
workers, because of their contributions to the social product, are enti-
tled to more from society than the beachcomber who contributes
nothing.
The focus on beachcombers has distracted us from fundamental
questions of economic and political justice that ability taxation ought
to raise, such as whether value in society is properly measured by ref-
erence to market rates on labor and how nonmarket labor (or below-
market labor) is counted in dividing the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation.80 Whereas the beachcomber forsakes the market and
produces nothing, many people are productive outside the market or
not fully compensated within it. Liberal egalitarians are more likely
than utilitarians or libertarians to reject market price as a reliable
measure for the benefits of social cooperation.
We must choose a paradigm that better considers what individuals
in a community owe each other and what the sovereign owes all indi-
viduals. Productive work-even if not well-paying-is an important
free and equal moral persons who can contribute to, and honor the constraints of, social
cooperation for the mutual benefit of all." Rawls, note 37, at 365. This means that Rawls
is not talking about the society of two people in which only one of them is able to work and
both depend on him to prevent starvation. He is concerned with fair terms of cooperation
among people in society.
77 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 321 (1999).
78 Part of the definition of a well-ordered society for Rawls is one in which "[tihe
scheme of basic institutions is a more or less self-sufficient and productive scheme of social
cooperation for mutual good." John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, in Col-
lected Papers, note 37, at 232, 234.
79 Homemakers are an important paradigm for Shaviro and for me. See Shaviro, note
16, at 138-39; Sections III.C, V.D.
80 See Section III.D.
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element of the social contract and a reasonable condition for citizen-
ship. From that perspective, the better paradigm is the low-wage
worker, homemaker, or volunteer. Requiring every individual to
make some contribution to the social project is a far cry from the con-
clusion that such contribution should be based on an individual's abil-
ity to earn income within the given structures of the society. It is not
necessary to impose tax based on endowment to make productive co-
operation a necessary requirement for social entitlements.
C. Unpacking the Strands of Taxing Leisure: Below-Market Work,
Nonmarket Work, and Pure Recreation
An endowment tax is more efficient than an income tax or a con-
sumption tax because it taxes leisure, which neither of the other bases
reaches. An endowment tax taxes leisure because in addition to ac-
tual income, it includes the excess of ability to earn over actual earn-
ings. The assumption behind including everything in this
undifferentiated category of leisure is that all activities that fail to pro-
duce one's maximum wage rate provide equivalent levels of well-be-
ing. Thus, unpaid housework is measured at full endowment rates,
whether it consists of reading to one's children or washing the floors,
regardless of the recreational pleasure or social benefits of the activ-
ity. Low-paid work that is measured at partial endowment rates
imagines that the down-and-out CEO gets almost as much leisure
from working in the mailroom as he does playing golf all day. This
definition of leisure would not only be unrecognizable to most people,
but it also aggregates different things that might be better separated in
thinking about a just tax system.
The label "leisure," which is standard in both the legal and eco-
nomic tax literature, implies that the difference between actual earn-
ings and potential earnings is (1) nonproductive, (2) self-regarding,
and (3) chosen. Each of these implications is questionable. If the fail-
ure to earn one's maximum wage rate is not all three of these things,
then the endowment tax may measure ability in an arbitrary way. A
tax system trying to reach self-regarding leisure only should be con-
cerned with whether the difference between actual wage and potential
wage is in the nature of production or consumption. Productive activ-
ities outside the market are important in determining how individuals
participate in social cooperation, and some activities might appropri-
ately substitute for tax paid in money. Unpacking the meaning of the
leisure that enters the tax base in an endowment tax sheds doubt on
whether inequality is appropriately measured by differences in wage
rates.
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The excess of wage rate over actual wage includes a much broader
variety of activities than pure recreation. When people are not work-
ing for their maximum possible market wage or enjoying pure recrea-
tion, they may be engaged in non-wage-maximizing work or unpaid
work that is productive, though not remunerated. These two catego-
ries in the spectrum between wage-maximizing work and pure recrea-
tion need separate attention in the tax debate. An endowment tax
treats all these iterations of leisure the same, and taxes them all. But
those most concerned with fairness in taxation would distinguish these
different categories, and anyone interested in moral agency would be
particularly solicitous of the nonmarket activities that express a per-
son's individuality.
D. Productivity Cannot Be Measured in Market Valuation
There is a normative bias in favor of market work contained in the
definition of leisure taken for granted in the tax policy literature. By
collapsing nonmarket productivity and low-paid work performed by
high-endowment individuals into leisure, the labor/leisure distinction
undervalues nonmarket labor and all work that fails to garner an indi-
vidual's maximum wage. Leisure, defined as any non-wage-maximiz-
ing work, is a meaningless category in the design of a fair tax since not
all leisure is equal.
Underlying the attraction of an endowment tax is an intuition that
favors productivity, but productivity does not always entail maximum
market wage activity. Taxing ability to earn implies that the market is
a neutral baseline because the tax system accepts the measure of po-
tential earnings by reference to the value that markets create. But to
really capture leisure in its more nuanced form, an endowment tax
must distinguish between productivity and consumption without ac-
cepting the correctness of market valuation. There are activities that
take place outside the market that produce social value, but a tax that
lumps all non-wage-maximizing activities into the leisure category
fails to account for them. A tax that considers a mediocre lawyer's
wage rate to be the highest and best use of a great sculptor's endow-
ment presumes that sculpting is in the nature of leisure for him. The
sculptor's talent may not ever be reflected in his wage rate but that
does not transform his work into recreation.
Stark argued that the tax system assigns greater "moral worth" to
nonmarket activities if it does not treat the choice to earn money and
the choice to create art as equal commodity choices.81 But taxing
them the same-when one produces money that may exceed any in-
81 Stark, note 34, at 65.
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trinsic value (and vice versa)-assigns greater moral worth to highly-
compensated market activities. The argument for taxing them the
same institutionalizes the moral capacity of the market by allowing
those who enter markets to retain greater after-tax rewards.
Taxation is crucial in determining what is valued in society-it does
not just reflect value that is otherwise fixed outside of it.82 The rela-
tionship of taxation and justice is dynamic in the sense that a just tax
must vary along a dimension that measures inequality, but choosing
that dimension legitimizes it as a measure of value in society. Ability
to earn is attractive as a measure because it speaks to undeserved or
accidental advantages that allow some individuals to reap rewards un-
available to others. But the consequence of using taxation to correct
for differences in abilities to earn reinforces market-based earnings as
an accurate indication of social contribution. Any tax that accepts
wage rate as the measure of a person's worth adopts a limited view of
the value of individuals.
Taxing based on ability to earn also has a highly-gendered implica-
tion, given the fact that women are more likely to compromise their
wage work for family production. The homemaker is unlikely to be
maximizing leisure (as recreation) as opposed to productivity (as
work) when she invests her time in her children. A narrow focus that
only validates wage-rate productivity ignores how diverse applied en-
dowments otherwise affect society. Many activities-including activi-
ties characterized both as work and as leisure-have social values that
are not reflected in the wages they command in the market. The mar-
ket does not value many things that are important to society. By look-
ing only at a person's potential to earn income, an endowment tax
takes too narrow a view of being a person and institutionalizes the
market as the prime mechanism for determining that value.
In requiring full recognition of social value, it becomes clear why
beachcombers, who produce nothing, are irrelevant to the justice of
the tax system. But the homemaker and the relief worker produce
something important that should count in determining obligation for
society's support. A fair tax should give credit for citizenship obliga-
tions paid in the form of social productivity, particularly if that work is
paid poorly. It is a mistake to argue that such credit would privilege
relief workers and homemakers compared to their wage-maximizing
neighbors. Instead, that credit would be a societal acknowledgement
that the discount they accept from their maximum wage rate is a valu-
able social contribution. It would also, as importantly, reject the valu-
ation of markets as the measure of social worth. A tax on ability to
82 See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Geo. L.J. 1571 (1996) (arguing that
the failure to tax housework devalues that work).
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earn gets that calculation backwards by imposing a greater real sacri-
fice on those who have already contributed in kind to the social
product.
Once we recognize the problem of assigning moral content to the
wage-rate baseline, the more difficult task of determining value with-
out that reference is imperative. Unfortunately, it is much easier to
seize on a market price than to quantify intrinsic value. But that is no
excuse for ignoring the fact that some people contribute their fair
share to society despite small tax payments. Proponents of equality in
taxation must consider how best to incorporate the complexities of
measuring valuation and productivity into the standard analyses of
ability to pay and equal sacrifice. 3 Relying on market wage rates and
taxing abilities to earn according to them is too thin a conception of
distributive justice.
E. It Matters that Taxes Need to Be Paid in Money
In addition to the valuation challenge, another problem with enrich-
ing the conception of social contribution and obligation beyond mar-
ket measures is that taxes are collected in money. All taxes, but an
endowment tax especially, discourage productive nonmarket work
and low-paying market work because the tax must be paid in money.
This is the reason why some have worried than an endowment tax
would enslave the able." It is a problem for those concerned with fair
taxation, but the objection is not properly understood as slavery of the
talented. Rather, because taxes must be paid in money, a tax that is
due without regard to activities that involve money forces individuals
to engage in money-producing endeavors,85 which may conflict with
core fairness concerns.
A central tenet of liberal egalitarian political theories is that the
state may not dictate the individual's life plan.8 6 Each individual is
entitled to develop her own conception of what makes life worthwhile.
83 Can the optimal tax model accommodate that demand? I leave it to the economists
to work on the math.
84 See, e.g., Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 Tax L. Rev. 263, 267 n.10
(2000) (arguing that taxing a person on their talents would "effectively enslave the able, by
forcing them to put their highly taxed talents to some lucrative employ, on pain of sitting in
a debtors' prison, however unpalatable the person found richly compensated work").
85 Kelman, note 38, at 841-42. This concern is what prompted Kelman to start this de-
bate by distinguishing income taxes from endowment taxes and distinguishing activities
that tax place in the market from those that take place outside of it. The liberal egalitarian
objection to endowment taxation should be understood as more specific than Kelman's
market/nonmarket dichotomy.
86 See id. at 842 (an endowment tax would "violate the simple libertarian principle that
the state should not require people, directly or indirectly, to engage in particular
activities").
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An endowment tax is a problem under that approach only where an
individual's idea of a meaningful life conflicts with the need to mone-
tize productivity in order to pay tax. For some people, market work
may conflict with an their idea of a meaningful life.
To test the nature of the philosophical objection to ability taxation,
imagine that the tax did not need to be paid in money. If we could
remove the bias in favor of market work by allowing individuals to
pay the tax with productive nonmarket work, then individuals minis-
tering to the poor could satisfy their obligations to the community by
engaging in their good works, and there would be no constraint on the
decision to work without pay. In that case, liberal egalitarians might
be more comfortable with endowment taxation because the determi-
nation of what makes life meaningful is what they are intent on pro-
tecting.87 The reason that endowment taxation is problematic is
because it forces the individual to come up with the money to pay the
tax, even if it prevents him from living the only meaningful life he
would otherwise choose. From this perspective, the endowment tax
does not need to enslave the talented to be repugnant. It only needs
to foreclose-for any individual-the possibility of living a meaningful
life.
This objection to ability taxation paid in money does not challenge
a requirement of social contribution, or taxation more generally. Jus-
tice in taxation is about what society legitimately demands from indi-
viduals who are part of it, and institutions of taxation and social
obligations within communities are consistent with just government.88
An endowment tax is unacceptable because it may prevent an individ-
ual's life plan, not because it imposes a social obligation. Many peo-
ple who do not earn enough money to pay an endowment tax or who
earn sufficiently little to be forced to change their occupation on ac-
count of the tax, could easily satisfy an in kind obligation to the com-
munity. The volunteer and relief worker would each be likely to
qualify. The in kind contribution of services might even exceed the
money tax that would have been levied based on ability to earn. The
only person for whom such a service-in-lieu-of-taxes regime would be
intractable is the beachcomber, or another individual like him with
high endowment and no productivity either within or outside the
market.89
97 See notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
88 Marjorie Kornhauser has argued specifically for progressive taxation on communitar-
ian terms. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 522 (1987) ("The progressive
income tax is a good way to reaffirm our nation's sense of community against the pulls of
individuality.").
89 But liberal egalitarians should not really care. See Section III.B.
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Showing equal concern and respect for each person in determining
her own life plans requires that the state refrain from forcing individu-
als into the market because nonmarket activities-such as volunteer-
ing and childcare-are often more integral to an individual's sense of
self than are the market activities in which they engage. A bias in
favor of nonmarket production over market work is more consistent
with liberal egalitarian concerns than the opposite because of the per-
sonal autonomy importance of many nonmarket activities.
This thought experiment-paying the tax in productive work, rather
than money-creates a host of questions that we avoid by requiring
that the tax be paid in money. If we allow productive work benefiting
the community to substitute for money paid to the state, we need to
decide what work qualifies as socially valuable enough to satisfy a per-
son's obligation. We might quibble over the value of that work, and
also over how much of the value should be treated as social value.
Homemakers, for example, produce both personal consumption for
their families and value for the community. While their activities cer-
tainly constitute work as opposed to recreation, that determination is
not the end of the inquiry that the thought experiment would require
in practice.90 Nevertheless, the point of the experiment is to flesh out
the nature of the fairness objections to endowment taxation; it is not
to advocate adoption of such a tax. Accounting for nonmarket pro-
ductivity challenges us first, to separate production from recreation
and then, to place a value on the productivity. Both of these tasks are
difficult, but necessary if we are serious about defining the extent to
which individuals fail to "work" up to their ability, as an endowment
tax requires. By exploring the implications of the Mirrlees ideal,91 its
flaws become more apparent.
The tax-in-production paradigm should remain a thought experi-
ment because there are good reasons for making taxation depend on
money. Government needs money, regardless of anything else it col-
lects from its people. Taxation in money allows some internal tax
norms to operate consistently and independent of the full complement
of political and social institutions.92 Rawls wrote that "[i]ncome and
wealth, understood broadly as they must be, are all-purpose means
(having an exchange value) for achieving directly or indirectly a wide
range of ends, whatever they happen to be." 93 This may be why it is
equitable to treat money as the measure for redistribution through
9 For an in-depth discussion of the issues implicated by a tax on household labor, see
Staudt, note 82.
91 See notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
92 See Dodge, note 47, at 450-61.
93 Rawls, note 37, at 366.
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taxation: Its redistribution preserves the individual agency that socie-
ties must guarantee.
One of Kelman's arguments for rejecting endowment taxation was
that the tax system does not try to measure satisfaction or utility-it is
about the money.94 A tax system that differentiates between activities
that produce money and those that do not may appropriately reflect
the limitations inherent in any system of taxation. Nevertheless, a tax
paid in money does not have to justify the moral status of the market.
In designing institutions of taxation, it may be necessary to look nar-
rowly for money, but without elevating it above all other arbiters of
social value.
IV. THE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL PROBLEMS IN
TAXING ABILITY ARE INSEPARABLE
A. The Definition of Endowment Is Unstable
Recall Mirrlees' first assumption: Earning potential is what we
would ideally tax.95 Embedded in that assumption is an additional
assumption: Earning potential means something. This Section argues
that earning potential is an incoherent ideal. It is unstable because
any individual's ability is simultaneously dynamic and socially con-
structed. Consequently, it is not possible to bracket the practical
problems of implementing an ability tax and analyze it on fairness
grounds.
Exploration of the endowment tax ideal requires development of a
definition of "endowment," even if its impracticality dispenses with
the need to measure it. Those drawn to ability taxation have put aside
the insurmountable practical problems to focus on the theoretical
ideal, and have distilled the concept of ability to earn to something
measurable, that is, wage rate.
Consider the definition that Shaviro offers:
[Endowment] merely describe[s] some aspect of the availa-
ble interactions between individuals and the world in which
they find themselves. Intellect may be a part of ability, along
with sound judgment, self-discipline, and the other aspects of
what has been dubbed "emotional intelligence." The same,
however, may go for good looks, parental influence, possess-
ing a white skin if customers are racists, having profitable
94 Kelman, note 38, at 839.
95 See note 9 and accompanying text.
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bad taste as an artist or performer, and the capacity for fraud
or violence.96
This description of endowment shows it to be highly contextual and
fluid. Endowment depends on fixed inherited traits, cultivation of
natural talents, and the changing market in which a person functions;
it depends on both actions taken by individuals and effects on them
that are outside their individual control, but subject to the political
will of the community. It is explicitly dependent on the market's in-
puts. While personal choices and cultural effects may be relevant for
justice in taxation, those factors conflict with the reasons why ability
taxation is attractive in the first place.
Recall that an endowment tax is appealing to economists because it
is free of substitution effects.97 But if ability is fluid and changes over
time as people make choices and market forces and cultural norms
shift, then the tax creates deadweight loss, and its attractiveness
wanes. Recalibrating endowment on a periodic basis means that peo-
ple can affect their future tax liability by failing to educate themselves
or by neglecting to develop their talents, creating social costs that
lump sum taxes are designed to avoid. An efficient ability tax cannot
contend with a dynamic endowment.
From the perspective of fairness, the instability of endowment is
also troubling. An endowment tax resonates from a fairness perspec-
tive because it recognizes that some individuals start with natural and
social advantages that others lack, and those advantages offend no-
tions of equality. A tax based on ability to earn seems tempting be-
cause it separates choices from circumstances, allowing individuals to
keep the rewards of hard work, but not of lucky breaks. Once endow-
ment is allowed to be fluid, there is no separation between choices and
circumstances-they are in a dynamic relationship that prevents theo-
retical identification of endowment as a separable measure. The only
way for endowment taxation to be free of distortion is for endowment
to be fixed.
The problem with ability is not merely that we lack the tools to
measure it, but that it is not measurable, even as a theoretical matter.
Rawls observed that "potential earnings capacity is not something in-
dependent from the social forms and the particular contingencies over
the course of life."98 A person's endowment changes as she makes
choices that enlarge or constrict her subsequent opportunities, and as
96 Shaviro, note 16, at 131 (citation omitted).
9 See notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
9 Rawls, note 37, at 253.
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circumstances around her change. It can never be reduced to a single
line on a graph, as its proponents contend.99
The frozen ideal of a fixed and measurable endowment takes a
static, ex ante approach to justice that undermines the vibrant nature
of being a person. If society is to respect individual agency, then abil-
ity must be allowed to change over time. But for endowment taxation
to be an attractive ideal from the perspective of either efficiency or
fairness, ability to earn must be both determinable and prepolitical.
Because it is neither of those things, it fails as a theoretical, as well as
a practical ideal.
B. Luck Matters in Turning Ability into Earnings
There is a gap between one's ability to earn and one's actual earn-
ings that needs to be understood in a just tax system. A tax on poten-
tial earnings presumes that those earning less than they are able to
earn are slacking off or underperforming. But ability is inseparable
from luck, which plays an important role both in determining a per-
son's natural endowments and in influencing how they develop. A
person with high ability, but mediocre earnings may be unlucky rather
than lazy, particularly in societies where prizes are scarce and many
eligible individuals are competing for them. In winner-take-all mar-
kets,10o which the United States has increasingly become, there are
only a limited number of big prizes available (like major-league sports
contracts and movie-star roles, but also law-firm partnerships and
CEO positions) and many qualified people striving for them. The ulti-
mate winners are likely to have profited from a significant dose of
good luck in addition to high potential. They need talent and drive,
which are presumably included in measuring their endowment. But
winner-take-all markets, by definition, imply that there are many peo-
ple who share the potential for such returns, even though only a few
actually achieve them. In such a system, we should be wary about
connecting tax burdens to potential returns, since reaching one's po-
tential is highly contingent on factors other than personal choice.
Over time, luck can change. This is another way that endowment is
dynamic. Most simply, a highly-endowed person will be more success-
99 See Shaviro, note 16, at 130 fig.5.2.
100 See generally Robert H. Frank & Phillip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society:
How More and More Americans Compete for Ever Fewer and Bigger Prices, Encouraging
Economic Waste, Income Inequality, and an Impoverished Cultural Life (1995). The tax
literature has been intrigued by the implications of winner-take-all markets for tax policy.
See Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 1151,
1214-16 (2006) (noting that the winner-take-all theory suggests progressive taxation); Mc-
Mahon & Abreu, note 28, at 3-11 (providing data supporting the growth of the winner-
take-all phenomenon and suggesting that it favors progressive taxation).
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ful if he is in the right place at the right time, or if he is lucky enough
to have a quality that is in style at a particular moment. An aptitude
for numbers may have been very valuable before computers became
ubiquitous. In a more complex way, every choice made in the past by
an individual affects all the available choices that succeed it; there is
no going back to the precise choices that an individual previously
failed to make. While people can always change their lives, it is fool-
hardy to believe that all doors remain open forever. At some point in
every person's life, potential to earn and actual earnings are likely to
converge. The sum of past choices determine future opportunities.
In addition to the problem of taxing high-ability, low-earning indi-
viduals excessive amounts, an ability tax is troubling at the other ex-
treme. Some lucky people earn vastly more money than their
endowments would reasonably allow them to expect. If endowment is
tied to human capital, then windfalls unrelated to wages seem to be
beyond the scope of an endowment tax. Consider the pop star with
only mediocre talent, or the lottery winner who reasonably should
have expected to lose. Do these winners get a windfall under an en-
dowment tax that allows them to keep their outsized gains free of tax
since they exceeded their potential? That seems even more perverse
than taxing those who fall short of theirs. In defining endowment, is it
even possible for a person to succeed beyond her endowment, or does
the concept of endowment define the maximum possible earnings, no
matter how unlikely? Recent research suggests that hard work and
practice is more important in creating success than is inherent ability,
and that "the trait we commonly call talent is highly overrated."' 0
Given that, it is hard to argue that society's ultimate measure of ine-
quality should be so dependent on it.
These many questions show that the practical problems of measure-
ment are not the major barrier in using ability as the tax base. Either
endowment is a moving target that makes taxing it subject to the same
criticisms directed at income and consumption taxes, or it is limited in
a way that fails to reflect important differences among individuals and
across lifetimes. Recognizing that endowment changes over time is
attractive from the perspective of fair taxation because it reflects the
real opportunity costs of a given course of action, but it also makes
endowment partly a product of individual choice, which is problematic
from the perspective of efficient taxation. If individual potential is
understood to be culturally created and culturally specific, a person's
101 Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, A Star Is Made: Where Does Talent Really
Come From?, N.Y. Times Mag., May 7, 2006, at 24 (discussing The Cambridge Handbook
of Expertise and Expert Performance (K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J.
Feltovich & Robert R. Hoffman eds., 2006)).
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endowment depends on the values of a particular society at a particu-
lar moment and can change many times over the course of a single
life. In order to be an attractive ideal, endowment must overcome this
problem of theoretical indetermination.
V. EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: WHY LIBERTARIANS AND
LIBERAL EGALITARIANS DIFFER ON TAXATION
A. Equality Is About Institutions, Not Wage Rates
Liberal egalitarians are concerned with the relationship of individu-
als to one another in society, and with the structure of society. Equal-
ity is a matter of guaranteeing equal respect for each person in the
design of social institutions.102 This Section explains why endowment
taxation fails to satisfy the demands of equality understood in this
way. Because liberal egalitarians reject the reduction of the individual
to a one-dimensional measure, a fair tax cannot be based on any single
isolated variable. If a person's relationship with the state depends on
his endowment, there is no social significance to what he makes of his
life. An ability tax defines people by their endowments, and thereby
makes individual reason and agency irrelevant because the social con-
sequences to individuals do not depend on their choices at all.
Although liberal egalitarians disagree about the precise content of
equality, inequality in wage rate clearly fails to capture their concern
that government respect all individuals equally. Rawls wrote: "That
[people] are equal is expressed by the supposition that they each have,
and view themselves as having, a right to equal respect and considera-
tion in determining the principles by which the basic arrangements of
their society are to be regulated."103 Equality therefore can be under-
stood as a guarantee of citizenship. People are entitled to make
claims on their institutions in advancing their conception of the
good.104 The fairness objections to endowment taxation derive from
this understanding of equality. Endowment taxation is inconsistent
with treating people as equal moral agents because their agency is ig-
nored by its design; in its indifference to choice it forecloses certain
choices.
102 Anderson, note 77, at 289 ("[T]he most fundamental test any egalitarian theory must
meet [is] that its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens.").
103 John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in Collected Papers, note 37, at 254,
255.
'0 Rawls, note 74, at 32.
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B. The Meaning of Liberty Differs for Libertarians
and Egalitarians
The liberal egalitarian objections to endowment taxation have un-
fortunately been described as "liberty" objections, creating confusion
among the libertarian and liberal egalitarian concerns. Unlike utilitar-
ians, libertarians and liberal egalitarians value individual freedom for
its own sake. Their conceptions of that freedom, however, are signifi-
cantly different from one another, and those differences explain why
libertarians are skeptical of all taxation, while liberal egalitarians are
generally accepting of taxation, but consider ability taxation
unacceptable. 05
Libertarians are opposed to endowment taxation, but not because it
particularly troubles them; all taxation is akin to slavery for libertari-
ans because they assign to individuals absolute property rights in all
human production. Robert Nozick argues that taxation makes the
state a "part owner" of individuals, giving it a "property right" in peo-
ple. 106 That perspective rejects all forms of taxation, regardless of tax
base. It arises from the libertarian notion of liberty as a negative
guarantee, consistent with an atomistic approach to the individual. To
the contrary, liberal egalitarians do not understand liberty as deriva-
tive of property rights in people, so the libertarian approach to liberty
cannot be transferred into a liberal egalitarian framework. Rather,
liberties are prior to property rights, clearly distinguishing them from
the libertarian's "liberty," which is defined in terms of prepolitical
property rights.
Rawls treats "liberties" as a set of values that rejects the preemi-
nence of a single merit like property. He explains that "no priority is
assigned to liberty as such, as if the exercise of something called 'lib-
erty' had a preeminent value and were the main, if not the sole, end of
political and social justice." 07 There is "no special priority for any
particular liberty."108 Thus, Rawls presents a set of liberties, all of
which are to be maximized for everyone, unlike Nozick's liberty,
which is singular and exclusive. In addition, in a Rawlsian conception,
not all liberties are basic, so not all liberties are deserving of the same
high level of respect (the freedom to contract, for example).109 It is
consequently a mistake to equate the liberty that libertarians define in
terms of absolute property rights with the liberties that liberal egal-
105 This may explain why Stark seizes upon libertarian concepts in analyzing the liberal
objections to an endowment tax. See Stark, note 34, at 49.
106 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 172 (1974) (emphasis omitted).
107 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 44 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
108 Id.
109 Rawls, note 103, at 260.
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itarians value. The latter derive from the guarantee of equal respect
for each person to choose her own life within the social context that
includes others doing the same thing. Under a liberal egalitarian
framework, liberty objections to endowment taxation must arise out
of the set of liberties and cannot be based on an understanding of
liberty as absolute and prepolitical ownership of one's person.
Not all taxation is an intrusion on liberty because taxation is one of
the institutions that is necessary in order for individuals to exercise
their freedom. Taxation allows the state to exist, so it is one compo-
nent of a just society, even though its particular design is not man-
dated. In specifically discussing endowment taxation, Rawls wrote:
I had mentioned that there is [a nonpractical] difficulty [with
endowment taxation], namely, the interference with liberty.
By that I meant, although I did not explain, interference with
the basic liberties . . .. To influence by taxation the trade-off
between leisure and income, say, is not an interference with
liberty until it infringes upon the basic liberties .... .11
The basic liberties are political, rather than economic: the right to
vote, freedom of speech, liberty of conscience, freedom from arrest,
and the right to hold property." Influencing the trade-off between
leisure and income is what income and consumption taxes do that en-
dowment tax avoids. But that trade-off is not a matter of justice be-
cause it does not implicate the freedoms that are necessary to
guarantee basic liberties. Rawls is not concerned with every limitation
on absolute freedom, but only on limitations that interfere with the
equal respect and concern each individual deserves. Most tax sys-
tems-including the income and consumption taxes that make leisure
a bit more attractive than work-can easily satisfy Rawls' demand for
freedom. The "liberties" approach that Rawls adopts allows broad
government participation, while the more expansive libertarian notion
of liberty is very restrictive of government action.
In rejecting the libertarian framework, Ronald Dworkin argues that
the idea of property ownership in one's labor is incoherent because
"the idea of pre-political entitlement based on something other than
equality" is "inconsistent with the premise of the scheme of equality"
that Dworkin explicates as the meaning of distributive justice.112 He
argues that liberty is part of the conception of equality that he
adopts-equality of resources.113 Equality of resources requires that
110 Rawls, note 78, at 252.
111 Rawls, note 72, at 61.
112 Dworkin, note 65, at 312.
113 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 121 (2000).
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individuals have equal opportunities to choose their life plans and that
they pay the true costs of the lives they lead, as measured by their
effects on others. 1 14 Like Rawls' approach, Dworkin's understanding
of liberty is limited and positive. He interprets liberty as "[r]ights
[n]ot [1]icense,"11 5 which fails to create an impermeable sphere in the
Nozickian manner. He also allows liberty to be compromised in the
name of equality as long as nobody is victimized by that constraint.116
The libertarian understanding of liberty cannot be mapped onto the
liberal egalitarian critique of endowment taxation. Thus, Stark's argu-
ments about liberty make the mistake of incorporating the libertarian
notion into a discussion of the liberal egalitarian understanding, col-
lapsing one into the other. He offers the example of a lawyer and a
sculptor, and argues that a tax on the lawyer but not the sculptor cre-
ates a "liberty cost" for the lawyer that the sculptor does not have. 117
But he does not explain what makes the tax a "liberty" cost in the
liberal egalitarian understanding of liberty, in which it is limited and
positive. A tax concededly raises the price of the lawyer's profession,
but the trade-off between leisure and labor is not a matter of justice.
The increased price is only a liberty cost if liberty is property, and any
interference with one's right to keep everything produced in the mar-
ket is a matter of justice.
The liberal egalitarian understanding of liberty requires a more
nuanced analysis of the limitations that the tax actually imposes in a
specific social context. A tax creates an issue of justice only if it inter-
feres with the ability of the individual to make claims on others in
society and on the institutions of government, and undermines her
ability to make her life meaningful. But there is no liberty objection
every time that government affects the price of individuals' choices.
Individuals can be required to pay a tax without any imposition on
their ability to pursue their conception of the good.118 Not every in-
creased cost is a liberty imposition where liberty is understood as po-
litical freedoms and institutional design, and the pretax market price
of any choice has no normative significance in that framework.
114 Dworkin, note 65, at 295.
us Dworkin, note 113, at 126-27.
116 Victimization is defined as "when the value of the liberty citizens retain is at least as
great as the value of the unconstrained freedom they would have had in a defensible distri-
bution." Id. at 175.
117 Stark, note 34, at 60.
118 See Rawls, note 37, at 365-70.
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C. Liberty Protects Decisions and Property Protects Rewards
In the liberal egalitarian framework, liberty is better understood as
concerned with restrictions that attach to decisionmaking, and prop-
erty is better understood as restrictions that attach to rewards. The
tax imposed only on the lawyer (who makes money) and not the
sculptor (who does not) does not reduce the lawyer's set of options,
but does make certain choices more expensive than others. There is
no restriction on the lawyer's pursuit of his conception of the good, so
there is no fairness objection to the tax.119 Only if the restrictions on
the rewards negate the ability to choose ex ante is the initial ability to
choose a conception of the good implicated in the division of property
rights. If a tax allowed an individual only one choice in life, it would
tread upon his liberty.120 However, it is not necessary for the tax to
leave only a single choice for it to create a liberty concern; if it fore-
closes any choice that must be preserved to allow an individual a
meaningful life, the tax violates principles of justice. This is why en-
dowment taxation is fundamentally different from income and con-
sumption taxes and uniquely inequitable. Unlike income and
consumption taxation, endowment taxation forecloses individuals
from pursuing some conceptions of the good.121 Such a tax is particu-
larly troublesome because the foreclosed options, though limited, are
most likely to be those most connected to an individual's personal
agency, such as the choice to stay home with one's children or to
devote one's life to helping others.
The notion that the state's ability to tax "extinguishe[s]" the individ-
ual's liberty interest 22 depends not only on a conception of liberty
that is absolute, but also a liberty without corresponding obligations.
Even Nozick maintains that while he generally should be allowed to
put his knife where he wants, that freedom does not include placing it
in your chest.123 In any social system, absolute liberty is impossible
and mutual obligations are necessary. Richard Epstein, legal
academia's most influential libertarian, concedes that absolute free-
119 Perhaps Murphy and Nagel were similarly distinguishing between limits on decisions
and rewards when they argued that endowment taxation is too much interference with
autonomy, though not a unique type of interference. Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 122-25.
120 Id. at 123.
121 Contrary to Stark, I understand Louis Kaplow's maximum endowment tax-a pro-
posed tax on endowment subject to a cap of 90% of earnings-to concede this distinction
because the cap preserves the ability to make choices by limiting the effects to price. Stark
argues that Kaplow's cap "takes the wind out of the liberty objections." Stark, note 34, at
63. 1 believe that his proposal actually accommodates those objections.
122 Id. at 60.
123 Nozick, note 106, at 171.
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dom from government intervention delegitimizes much of law as we
know it.124 Freedom without obligation is inconsistent with society.
Murphy and Nagel plot interference with liberty along a continuum
that treats all individual interests as intricately balanced in society. In
that respect, their approach is consistent with Rawls, who believed
that "none of these liberties is absolute; but however they are adjusted
to form one system, this system is to be the same for all."1 2 5 Thus, the
comparison of endowment taxation with income or consumption taxa-
tion must account for the degree of interference with liberty and the
countervailing obligations that attend to that liberty. A tax presents
problems on these terms when freedom to pursue one's vision of the
good is abrogated by the fiscal claims of the state. It is important
whether government interference prevents a person from pursuing
her conception of a meaningful life. That issue is often one of degree,
as Murphy and Nagel suggest. Intrusive or onerous taxation may in-
terfere with a person's ability to pursue her conception of the good,
while the same tax in less onerous form may not. For example, a
100% income tax would leave a person at the mercy of the state, while
a 20% tax on income above a threshold would not.
As long as we conceptualize the difference between income and en-
dowment taxation in terms of degree of interference with liberty, the
objections to both taxes are on the same terms. The debate has stalled
because some believe that the degree of interference with liberty is a
matter of justice, 126 while others maintain that only the kind of inter-
ference-but not the degree-is a matter of justice. 127 While their
conclusions about endowment taxation differ, they share a common
approach that depends on a particular understanding of the relation-
ship between labor and leisure, and accepts the assumption that every-
thing is substitutable. It is worthwhile to shift the terms of the debate
by moving away from the labor-leisure trade-off and the sub-
stitutability that it implies. Then, an endowment tax is an interference
that differs in kind from an income or consumption tax.
D. What If Labor and Leisure Cannot Be Traded Off
If labor and leisure are not always substitutes for one another, then
the difference between an endowment tax and an income tax is not
just one of degree, but one of kind. By privileging leisure, an income
tax never requires that a person work for money. By taxing regardless
124 See Richard A. Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozick's Minimal State: The Role of
Forced Exchanges in Political Theory, 22 Soc. Phil. & Poi'y 286, 289-91 (2005).
125 Rawls, note 103, at 259.
126 Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 121-25.
127 Stark, note 34, at 65.
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of work, an endowment tax forces those who prefer 100% nonwage
activity (whether nonmarket work or recreation) to work enough to
pay the tax. It may be helpful to understand the debate as a "disa-
greement over the social construction of the good 'leisure."' 128 Writ-
ing from a philosophical perspective, Andrew Stark argues that the
debate about equality could more profitably be channeled into a dis-
cussion about the social construction of goods, and about the assump-
tions we have about whether goods are (1) generic or specific (what
he terms "coarse-grained" versus "fine-grained") and (2) more or less
easily substituted for one another.129 He argues that the endowment
tax question turns on the conceptualization of leisure, and that an en-
dowment tax is no more enslaving130 than an income tax if leisure is
treated as a wholly substitutable good.
In deciding whether leisure is substitutable, it must be categorized
either as a coarse-grained or fine-grained good. A coarse-grained un-
derstanding generalizes leisure, treating everyone's leisure as the same
good despite the fact that different individual wage rates imply differ-
ent costs of leisure for different individuals. A fine-grained under-
standing treats each individual's leisure as a separate and distinct
good. The more fine-grained is our understanding of a good, the less
substitutable it is likely to be (Andrew Stark uses self-respect as the
model for a nonsubstitutable good).131 If we adopt a coarse-grained
understanding of leisure, then a fair distribution of goods may require
reallocating leisure, but if we treat leisure as essentially connected to
the individual (that is, you have no use for my leisure) then there is no
unfairness arising from its unequal distribution.132 An endowment tax
is more enslaving than an income tax if leisure is fine-grained and
nonsubstitutable because "any range of work-leisure choices that does
not include a life of leisure-however otherwise unconstrained-can-
not substitute for one that does."133 Thus, even though an endowment
tax leaves open many choices of work and leisure, it does not allow an
individual to choose not to work at all.
128 Andrew Stark, Beyond Choice: Rethinking the Post-Rawlsian Debate over Egalita-
rian Justice, 30 Pol. Theory 36, 47 (2002).
129 Id. at 61.
130 The endowment tax debate has been largely concerned with whether an endowment
tax "enslaves" the able. Rawls suggested that it might. Rawls, note 78, at 252. Murphy
and Nagel and Stark specifically consider the question. Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 121-
29; Stark, note 128, at 49-51. This Article tries to move away from framing the issue as
slavery of the more able, and argues that endowment taxation is problematic even if it does
not rise to the level of slavery for the talented.
131 Stark, note 128, at 57.
132 Id. at 49-51.
133 Id. at 49.
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This framework of substitutability is helpful in thinking about the
full-time homemaker and why she is important in analyzing the fair-
ness of an ability tax. If the good in question is a generic understand-
ing of childcare, then a combination of purchased daycare and market
employment is a substitute for staying home. If it is, then an endow-
ment tax differs from an income tax in degree and not in kind; neither
is more burdensome in kind because they both allow the mother to
adjust her home and work hours to maximize her overall well-being
after tax. But many homemakers have chosen to care for their chil-
dren at a very high cost in lost market wages and opportunities pre-
cisely because they believe that there is no life of work and delegated
care of children that substitutes for staying home and raising them. So
an endowment tax, which might allow a homemaker to have a wide
range of occupations and combinations of labor and leisure, does not
allow her to have the one life that she chooses, and the life for which
there is no substitute-the life of caring for her children herself. Un-
derstood this way, protection of that choice is imperative in a just soci-
ety because it guarantees that the mother may choose the only life
that she thinks is worth living.
Even if an inheritance or a rich spouse finances the homemaker's
endowment tax 134 and allows her to have the life she wants despite the
tax, the state's demand on endowment is still not legitimate. The tax
presents a necessary question of justice because it is an institution of
government that is designed to foreclose the individual's choice. This
is the central concern of equality, and the state may not design an
institution that fails to give the homemaker's life plans equal respect
and concern, even if she finds ways to compensate. The state's role
differs when it simply fails to enable a particular vision; if I believe
that the only way to have a meaningful life is to jet around the world
like an heiress, my inability to choose that life is not a question of
justice if no government institution is responsible in any way for fore-
closing it.
This framework is also illuminating in thinking about the relief
worker. He differs from the homemaker because his chosen occupa-
tion allows him to earn money, just not as much as his endowment
might have allowed him to earn. An ability tax could leave the relief
worker with tax liability in excess of income, despite full-time market
employment, an untenable situation. He may not have only one
choice of profession in that case, but he is foreclosed from the choice
that he preferred and that he would have made in the absence of the
tax. Considering whether a tax enslaves by allowing a person only a
134 Then, the state might consider the significance of the inheritance or the spouses'
wealth or income in designing a tax.
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single course in life approaches the question backwards, compared to
this framework of social construction. This approach requires a focus
on whether the tax forecloses any single choice that must be main-
tained in order for an individual to have the ability to design her life's
plans.
Any tax system, including an endowment tax, could impose a small
enough tax to permit its satisfaction with a wide variety of occupa-
tional choices. Only an endowment tax at a confiscatory rate would
truly enslave the talented or tax the relief worker in excess of income.
So if the standard for liberty depends on leaving people only a single
choice of occupation, there is really no liberty limitation on tax sys-
tems. But the standard for liberal egalitarians is not dependent on
leaving only one choice. In this Section, I have tried to give a variety
of reasons why liberal egalitarians should be understood as concerned
with foreclosing choices. An endowment tax need not be confiscatory
and enslaving in order to be objectionable to liberal egalitarians; it
just needs to prevent a person from pursuing her unique conception of
the good. From this perspective, the question of substitutability is im-
portant because where there are no substitutes, the tax prevents the
individual from exercising her freedom. To the contrary, where a tax
raises the relative price of some choices in a market that determines
value without implying intrinsic worth, there is not necessarily any im-
position on liberty because an individual's choices may remain uncon-
strained despite those effects. Thus, even though an endowment tax
may not so limit a person's life choices so as to rise to the level of
"slavery," it is nonetheless unacceptable in a just society.
VI. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND ENDOWMENT TAXATION
A. The Affinity of Equal Opportunity and Taxation
Based on Ability to Earn
The equal opportunity norm that has inspired some of the most re-
cent considerations of justice in taxation 35 explains some of the initial
attraction of endowment taxation. An endowment tax reflects a com-
mitment to equal opportunity because it depends on whether a person
had a greater or lesser opportunity to succeed in the society. Those
with greater endowments within a given social structure are ad-
vantaged in the opportunity for welfare, so an endowment tax burdens
them more than individuals who had less opportunity for welfare. Al-
135 See generally Anne Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 Harv.
L. Rev. 469 (2007) (evaluating whether the inheritance tax is designed to reflect the princi-
ple of equal opportunity); Repetti, note 11, at 1131 (arguing the principle underlying a just
government is the creation of equal opportunities).
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though no liberal egalitarian theory considers equal opportunity suffi-
cient to constitute justice, it is a shared concern, reflected in
Dworkin's ideal of equality of resources and Rawls' second principle
of justice. An equal opportunity norm allows differences in welfare
on account of different ambitions and effort, but not on account of
natural talents and social hierarchy. A commitment to equal opportu-
nity means attention to whether individuals start with advantages that
others do not have. Social institutions should be designed to equalize
the potential welfare of every individual.
The problem with ability taxation is not that it fails to promote
equal opportunity, but that it takes the interest in equal opportunity
and allows it to undermine itself and trump other norms. It uses the
institution of taxation to reduce the opportunities of some without
necessarily increasing the opportunities of others. It ignores every-
thing that actually happens in a person's life, whether by choice or
not. Because the tax has to treat endowment as a fixed and immuta-
ble characteristic, 136 it institutionalizes the hierarchy of abilities, even
while it attempts to adjust the outcomes they produce. It reduces a
person to a single dimension outside of her control.
The debate in the legal literature parallels a debate taking place in
the philosophy literature in which scholars have been debating the
role of "choice" versus "circumstances" in thinking about equality.
There is broad consensus across the philosophical spectrum that some
inequality can be just, but liberal egalitarians have been struggling
with determining when and on what basis differences in distributive
shares are consistent with an equality norm. Rawls believed that ine-
quality in wealth and income could be just, but that differences in
shares that arise on account of differences in natural abilities and tal-
ents are "arbitrary from a moral point of view."13 7 Dworkin also be-
lieved that economic inequalities are just, but only those that arise
from differences in ambitions, rather than abilities.'38 Thus, inequal-
ity in material goods and well-being is acceptable in a just society if it
flows from choices, but not from circumstances.
The distinction between choice and circumstances potentially estab-
lishes a basis for the dichotomy between just and unjust market re-
wards and endowment may be the way to separate those rewards
because it presents a mechanism for isolating circumstances. Taxation
is an obvious choice for neutralizing the effects of arbitrary differ-
ences; its attraction is in its apparent power to level the starting place
136 See discussion in Section IV.A (explaining that a fluid understanding of endowment
collapses choice and circumstances and undermines the attractions of an endowment tax).
137 Rawls, note 72, at 72.
138 Dworkin, note 65, at 311.
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for individuals with different potentials. An endowment tax pinpoints
the cause of unjust gains that some individuals enjoy in society. Pre-
sumably, though not necessarily, it also redistributes to those with less
potential to earn disproportionate shares.13 Unfortunately, it oper-
ates by handicapping those most likely to succeed. By burdening the
most talented, an endowment tax targets one of the impediments to
equal opportunity in society, but simultaneously treads on individual
integrity and self-respect, other important norms.
The most effective solution to the equal opportunity challenge
would make the talents of all members of society a common good
shared by all-each person would be entitled to a pro rata share of the
total returns to ability in the community. Both Rawls and Dworkin
consider this possibility and explicitly reject it. Rawls wrote:
[E]ven if an equal distribution of natural assets seemed more
in keeping with the equality of free persons, the question of
redistributing these assets . . . does not arise, since it is in-
compatible with the integrity of the person. . . . We have a
right to our natural abilities and a right to whatever we be-
come entitled to by taking part in a fair social process. The
problem is to characterize this process. 140
Thus, for Rawls, injustice does not arise from the mere existence of
different endowments or circumstances. It arises on account of the
social consequences of those differences. Where Nozick takes for
granted that a person owns whatever he produces, Rawls defines the
question of justice in terms of how society assigns those rewards.
From this perspective, different endowments are not the root of social
or economic inequality or injustice. The social consequences of en-
dowment are where injustice may arise. It is because the market re-
wards those who are beautiful or smart or white-skinned or male, and
139 An institution other than taxation would determine the patterns of government
spending. Whether the system is just depends on all the relevant policies combined. See
Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 76-78 (noting that the government's role in distribution
should be kept analytically separate from the government's decisions regarding taxation);
Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls
Demands from Tax Systems, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1991, 1991-93 (2004). Hasen analyzes
taxation as inextricably related to purposes that it finances, concluding that an endowment
tax that finances public goods is consistent with social contract theory, but one that fi-
nances redistribution is not. Hasen, note 46, at 1061-62. His analysis of public goods ex-
plicitly adopts a benefits-tax perspective. Id. at 1089. His discussion of redistribution,
however, only implicitly adopts such a justification through his interpretation of the social
contract. Id. at 1075-80. Like Shaviro, I believe that the centrality of the equality question
in analyzing endowment taxation reflects an ability-to-pay perspective. Shaviro, note 16, at
125.
140 Rawls, note 37, at 263.
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those are the problems that need to be addressed by the institutions of
society. Differences in endowments themselves are not the social
problem.
In considering the issue, Dworkin wrote: "We might mention, but
only to dismiss, one possib[ility: allowing] our initial auction to in-
clude, as resources to be auctioned, the labor of the immigrants them-
selves."1 4 1 But he rejects it since it fails to guarantee equality of
resources to the most talented individuals, who would be required to
purchase their leisure at a very high rate.142 Making leisure expensive
for those with higher abilities to earn is precisely what an endowment
tax sets out to do because the tax is designed to fall on them most
heavily. Such a scheme fails Dworkin's envy test because it makes the
most talented individuals envy the lives of less talented individuals,
who can better afford their leisure.143 In rejecting an explicit commu-
nal sharing of natural abilities, Rawls and Dworkin must figure out
how to implement a commitment to equal opportunity while simulta-
neously preserving the integrity of the individual.
The tax policy literature has not distinguished different egalitarian
theories, but the debate in the philosophical literature shows that dif-
ferent interpretations of egalitarianism might have different responses
to endowment taxation. One of the problems in the tax policy litera-
ture is that it has often generalized too broadly about liberal egalita-
rian theories, even where they differ in important respects. It is
necessary to separate different theories that have been lumped to-
gether under the liberal egalitarian label to consider the proper role of
equal opportunity in designing systems of taxation. This Section tries
to specifically ground the objections to endowment taxation in the dis-
parate frameworks presented by Rawls and Dworkin. While both
Rawls and Dworkin would ultimately reject endowment taxation,
their reasons differ. For Rawls, endowment taxation is fundamentally
inconsistent with the first and most important principle: the guarantee
of equal liberties, and his concern for the least well-off cannot com-
141 Dworkin, note 65, at 311. But Dworkin rejects this possibility, explaining:
[T]he principle that people should not be penalized for talent is simply part of
the same principle we relied on in rejecting the apparently opposite idea, that
people should be allowed to retain the benefits of superior talent. The envy
test forbids both of these results. If [Talented] is treated as owning whatever
his talents enable him to produce, then [Clumsy] envies the package of re-
sources, including occupation, that [Talented] has over his life as a whole. But
if [Talented] is required to purchase leisure time or the right to a less produc-
tive occupation at the cost of other resources, then [Talented] will envy
[Clumsy's] package.
Id. at 312.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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promise that guarantee. 144 Dworkin's equality of resources is directed
to guaranteeing equal opportunity, but over a whole life, rather than
just at the starting gate, so it is concerned with both opportunities and
outcomes. Even so, it is properly understood as a more limited rejec-
tion of endowment taxation than Rawls' two principles of justice.
B. Rawls Clearly Rejects Endowment Taxation, Despite
its Equal Opportunity Appeal
Rawls' rejection of endowment taxation arises outside his discus-
sion of economic justice. His theory of justice consists of two princi-
ples, hierarchically related.145 The first principle demands equal
liberties and the second provides the framework for economic jus-
tice.146 Rawls includes fair equality of opportunity in the second prin-
ciple. 147 That means that the first principle's equal basic liberties are
prior to equal opportunity and that there may be limits imposed on
equal opportunity if necessary to fulfill the requirements of equal lib-
erties. Rawls lists the basic liberties as: freedom of thought and lib-
erty of conscience, political liberties (for example, the right to vote
and to participate in politics), and freedom of association, as well as
the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity (physical
and psychological) of the person, and finally, the rights and liberties
covered by the rule of law. 14 8 An endowment tax would undermine
the guarantee of human agency and personal integrity that the first
principle provides. If our endowment is the immutable measure that
makes it attractive to economists, then directly taxing it undermines
the humanity of the person, which requires the exercise of reason and
conviction during a person's life. Rawls treats natural goods, like
health and intelligence, as beyond the scope of his inquiry because
they are not controlled by the social structure. 149
For Rawls, equality of opportunity is an imperative in the design of
institutions of society, rather than an individual constraint. Rawls
writes in terms of institutions, expectations, and representative per-
sons because a just society operates at that level of abstraction, rather
than at the individual level of entitlement. In other words, his project
does not include a guarantee of equal opportunity for each individual
directly. Rather, it asks what institution of taxation would be most
likely to provide both the greatest protection for basic human liberties
144 Rawls, note 72, at 60.
145 Id. at 61.
146 Id. at 60.
147 But it is prior to the difference principle. Id. at 61.
148 Id. at 61.
149 Id. at 62.
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and fair equality of opportunity. The imperative is to design institu-
tions that take account of natural talent differences so that social insti-
tutions do not reinforce natural differences. Striving for equal
opportunity in the design of institutions is respectful to individual
agency because at the institutional level, there is no danger of deval-
uing individuals. There is no reason to erase the differences among
individuals as long as social institutions do not translate those differ-
ences into inequality in basic liberties or primary goods.
The most important reason why endowment taxation is unaccept-
able in a Rawlsian framework is because it intrudes on the highest
interest that individuals have-the free choice of ends, that is, an in-
terest in being able to shape their other interests as free people.o50
Autonomy is related to liberty.151 Rawls defines autonomy as "acting
from principles . . . that best express [individuals] as free and equal
rational beings." 152 In A Theory of Justice, he wrote:
[A] person is acting autonomously when the principles of his
action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible ex-
pression of his nature as a free and equal rational being ....
[A]cting unjustly is acting in a manner that fails to express
our nature as a free and equal rational being. Such actions
therefore strike at our self-respect, our sense of our own
worth .... We have acted as though we belonged to a lower
order, as though we were a creature whose first principles
are decided by natural contingencies.153
Just institutions "enable human beings to express their nature as
free and equal moral persons." 154 An ability tax is repellant because it
treats people as determined by their natural contingencies, lacking au-
tonomy in Rawls' sense. An endowment tax circumscribes the choice
of ends that each individual has because all choices must be made in
the face of an unvarying liability that must be paid in money. Once a
person's endowment is determined to be high, fewer choices of ends
remain available to her.
An endowment tax makes it exceedingly difficult to ensure that all
individuals have the "primary good of self-respect" 5 5 because it de-
fines people in the social structure by their potential ability to earn
150 This notion derives from Rawls' Kantian conception of autonomy. Taylor, note 75,
at 254-55.
151 See Part V.
152 Rawls, note 72, at 515.
153 Id. at 252, 256.
15 Id. at 513.
155 Id. at 546.
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income. While it might fund redistribution to the most lowly-en-
dowed, it simultaneously labels them as the least valuable members of
society. "None should view their situation as humiliating or degrad-
ing, nor should they be subject to circumstances they cannot help but
resent and acquiesce in only from timidity and fear of reprisal." 156
Rawls' conception of the person thus rejects endowment taxation be-
cause it undermines the self-esteem of poorly-endowed people by la-
beling them inferior, and the self-respect of highly-endowed people
who find themselves unable to do what they believe is important in
life.
C. Does the Difference Principle Support Endowment Taxation?
In his second principle of justice, Rawls explicates the difference
principle, which he states as: "Social and economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are . . . to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged .".. .s157 It has been called "maximin" in some of the
literature because it seeks to maximize the prospects of the least well-
off group.158 Richard Musgrave suggested that the worst-off in society
might be better-off with an endowment tax than with an income or
consumption tax because both of the latter allow substitution of lei-
sure for labor to affect taxation.'59 An endowment tax would make
leisure expensive for highly-endowed individuals and cheap for
poorly-endowed individuals. Thus, the worst-off group (in terms of
endowment) might gain an economic advantage in this system. Rawls
responded to Musgrave by rejecting the welfare-based premise under-
lying Musgrave's argument, and the transformation of primary goods
into measurements of welfare.160 Instead of debating the welfare of
individuals, Rawls speaks in terms of the social bases of self-respect
and the social institutions that are necessary to support self-esteem.161
The mere categorization of some people as highly-endowed and
others as poorly-endowed under a tax would clash with that require-
ment. Thus, the only way that the difference principle can be under-
stood to justify endowment taxation is by redefining the principle in
utilitarian terms, a mistake often made in applying Rawls to tax pol-
icy.162 But Rawls' theory of distributive justice is a rejection of
utilitarianism.
156 Rawls, note 78, at 250.
157 Rawls, note 72, at 83.
158 See, e.g., R.A. Musgrave, Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off, 88 Q.J.
Econ. 625 (1974).
159 See id. at 629-30.
160 Rawls, note 78, at 253.
161 Id. at 240.
162 See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, note 3, at 1915-16.
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The simplest explanation for why the difference principle cannot
mandate an ability tax is that the difference principle is hierarchically
inferior to the first principle, with which such a tax directly conflicts.
"[J]ustice in the relative shares of material means, is relegated to a
subordinate place." 63 Focusing on the least well-off in designing the
tax system is unnecessary because the requirements of the difference
principle can be fulfilled by a wide variety of tax systems, as long as
the society's spending patterns are designed to fulfill it.'6 The differ-
ence principle requires that society devote more resources to the least
well-off, but that doesn't imply anything about how we should garner
those resources from those better-off. Rawls rejects any attempt to
adjust endowments themselves, preferring to direct resources to the
more-challenged.165 He says:
Now the difference principle is not of course the principle of
redress. It does not require society to try to even out handi-
caps as if all were expected to compete on a fair basis in the
same race. But the difference principle would allocate re-
sources in education, say, so as to improve the long-term ex-
pectation of the least favored. 166
If anyone misinterpreted the difference principle and its application
to differences in endowment, he explains:
No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a
more favorable starting place in society. But it does not fol-
low that one should eliminate these distinctions . . . . The
basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies
work for the good of the least fortunate . . . . Aristocratic
and caste societies are unjust because they make these con-
tingencies the ascriptive basis for belonging to more or less
enclosed and privileged social classes.167
That some people have higher endowments than others is not unjust
in itself, according to Rawls. What may be unjust is what social insti-
tutions make of those natural facts.
Any story about the difference principle that supports ability taxa-
tion must also include redistribution to or investment in the least well-
off. The difference principle says that we should design institutions so
163 Rawls, note 72, at 546.
164 Sugin, note 139, at 1994-97.
165 Rawls, note 72, at 100-01.
166 Id. at 101.
167 Id. at 102.
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as to maximize the prospects of the least well-off members of society.
It is acceptable to improve the prospects of those better-off as well, as
long as the prospects of the worst-off are made better. Rawls wants
institutions to focus on increasing the prospects of the least well-off.168
Nothing about an endowment tax increases anyone's prospects-it
can only decrease the relative prospects of the more highly-endowed.
It could even depress the prospects of the worst-off group, if the sys-
tem failed to include sufficient redistribution or investment. An en-
dowment tax, by increasing the likelihood that individuals will be
lawyers or bankers instead of teachers or relief workers could as easily
reduce the prospects of the least well-off members of society. If
teachers and relief workers produce social benefits for the less well-off
members of society, an endowment tax could leave those people
worse off by reducing the pool of people willing to do those jobs. The
highly-endowed would-be teachers and drug-addiction counselors
might respond to the tax by choosing professions that provide less
benefit to the least well-off, precisely the opposite of Rawls' differ-
ence principle.
Under the difference principle, it is not unjust if people with higher
endowments have greater resources than people with lower endow-
ments as long as the increase at the top inures to the benefit of those
at the bottom.169 Rawls accepts the possibility that a just structure
would reduce the prospects of the most well-off, but he does not
choose that consequence as the goal of a just institution, as it is for an
ability tax. The difference principle requires that the expectations of
the least well-off be improved; reducing the expectations of those bet-
ter-off, as an endowment tax does, does nothing to guarantee that the
prospects of the less well-off would be improved.
D. Dworkin's Ex Anteism Is Sympathetic to Endowment Taxation
In contrast to Rawls, Dworkin makes equal opportunity central and
the distinction between endowment and effort a touchstone for jus-
tice. 170 Consequently, an endowment tax may fit better with his the-
ory than with Rawls'. In his classic treatment of distributive justice,
168 Id. at 101-02.
169 Id.
170 See Dworkin, note 113, at 4-7. The initial appeal of endowment taxation within
equality of resources may arise from the fact that Dworkin explicitly analyzes distributive
justice alone, as distinct from other aspects of his political theory. Dworkin starts his dis-
cussion of distributive justice with the caveat that "[d]istributional equality, as I describe it,
is not concerned with the distribution of political power, for example, or with individual
rights other than rights to some amount or share of resources." Id. at 12. Thus, he fails to
address the possibility that certain mechanisms of distributing or redistributing resources
might conflict with other rights. It is easier to identify Rawls' objections to endowment
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Dworkin queried whether the ideal of distributive justice should be
equality of welfare or equality of resources. He chose equality of re-
sources because it reflects a conception of equality in which any
scheme of distribution must "be sensitive to the cost of one person's
life to other people,"171 and individuals must "pay the true cost of the
lives that they lead."17 2 Equality of resources endorses an equal initial
distribution of shares, even though shares will become unequal over
time. Dworkin posits a desert island in which each individual has an
equal opportunity to secure his desired set of goods through an auc-
tion procedure that continues until nobody envies the bundle of goods
that anyone else possesses (the "envy test").173
The desert island replicates an ideal starting point of equal opportu-
nity, but even where equal opportunity is initially established, unequal
shares develop over time, and Dworkin is concerned with those une-
qual shares.174 Inequalities that result from extra effort are not unjust
in equality of resources. They do not fail the envy test-if one person
has a greater share of wealth on account of greater effort compared to
another who has less because she chose to work less hard, neither
should envy the other's overall bundle. 7 5 To the contrary, inequali-
ties that result from bad luck is a problem for fairness. Dworkin takes
care to distinguish "brute luck," such as being hit by lightning, from
"option luck," which resembles a reasoned gamble.176 A person
should be required to bear the consequences of purposeful risk-tak-
ing, so only bad brute luck is something that society might care to
remedy.' 77 Insurance provides a bridge between the two so that indi-
viduals who fail to secure insurance for brute luck are, in effect, taking
a reasoned gamble. 78
Nevertheless, Dworkin is not fully satisfied with insurance as the
solution to unequal opportunity because opportunity is not really
equal when people enter the market with different abilities.179 Since
Dworkin demands repeated satisfaction of the envy test over time, the
initial distribution, even if perfect, will not insure continuing equality
because people have unequal talents that will produce shares that fail
taxation precisely because he incorporates his ideas about economic justice into his general
theory that is primarily about political justice.
171 Dworkin, note 65, at 334.
172 Id. at 295.
173 Id. at 283-90.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 304-05 (noting that where "talents are equal, efficiency simply is fairness").
176 Id. at 293.
177 See id. at 293-97.
178 Id.
179 See id. at 296-97.
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the test. 80 Dworkin attempts to separate out the returns to natural
abilities (that others should envy) from the returns to effort (that
others should not envy). Returns to hard work are the earned product
of individual choice, while returns to talent are unearned and there-
fore subject to greater redistribution. This is where an endowment tax
seems like the solution to Dworkin's concerns because it accounts for
the differences in natural abilities among people entering the market
with equal material resources. An endowment tax appears to be a
mechanism for satisfying the envy test by taking from the more-able
the excess returns to their abilities, and presumably transferring that
excess to the less-able until the envy test is satisfied. Any conception
of equality that makes a central distinction between brute luck and
option luck invites a focus on the abilities that individuals bring to
society. Equal opportunity demands that everyone face the same
range of choices for which they will bear the consequences. An ability
tax seems an elegant solution to the whole problem of equality of re-
sources precisely because it is forward looking and leaves individuals
with the consequences of their choices.
A tax that corrects for different abilities to earn still fails to account
for the differences in earnings that depend on luck, as opposed to ei-
ther endowment or effort. The transformation of brute luck into op-
tion luck with insurance that Dworkin posits can never be complete,
so individuals remain subject to the vicissitudes of luck. The persis-
tence of brute luck, even in a world with insurance, presents a chal-
lenge to the application of equality of resources in taxation. If
Dworkin is really concerned about the consequences of bad luck that
people cannot avoid, then a tax system designed to implement equal-
ity of resources needs to be more sensitive to inequalities that result
from risks that society demands that people take.
Applying Dworkin's theory to taxation raises some questions about
the implications of the theory. Some have challenged Dworkin's in-
terpretation of equality on account of its ex ante/equal opportunity
perspective and its correspondingly rigid treatment of luck and de-
sert.18 Barbara Fried is critical of Dworkin's "'equal opportunity'
egalitarianism"18 2 because we (1) might not be rational deci-
sionmakers, 183 (2) are unable to properly assess risksIM and (3) may
not be able to avoid the risks we want to avoid because of how they
are presented to us. 8 5 She argues that a commitment to ex anteism is
180 Id. at 307.
181 See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 123 (2003).
182 Id. at 132.
183 Id. at 157-58.
184 Id. at 140.
185 Id. at 144-46.
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foundational to Dworkin's approach, and therefore problematic.186 If
justice requires that shares not depend on luck, then equality of re-
sources needs a mechanism for continually correcting for all the issues
attendant to risk.
If equality of resources depends on transforming brute luck into op-
tion luck, then the problems with doing that may undermine the pre-
mise of equality of resources. Elizabeth Anderson argues that
Dworkin and others, whom she describes as luck egalitarians, have a
"flawed understanding of the point of equality . . . dominated by the
view that the fundamental aim of equality is to compensate people for
undeserved bad luck."187 She argues that luck egalitarians do not sat-
isfy the basic requirement of treating people as equals because entitle-
ments to resources in their theories arise from inferiority to others,
rather than from equality.188 Luck egalitarians, she claims, "have for-
gotten that the primary subject of justice is the institutional arrange-
ments that generate people's opportunities over time." 89 The market
is completely irrelevant in determining questions of justice.190 Her
critique highlights the different approaches that Rawls and Dworkin
have taken.
These critiques of ex anteism in equality of resources are important
to the endowment tax debate because they support the interpretation
of equality of resources that accepts the ex anteism implicit in endow-
ment taxation. Ability taxation treats those with higher potential in-
come as better able to pay tax, even if they do not actually reach that
potential. It treats economic justice as concerned only with starting
points and never with results.
E. Equality of Resources Is Concerned with Outcomes
as Well as Opportunities
If Dworkin's commitment to ex anteism is as great as his critics de-
scribe it, then an endowment tax might be an acceptable institution
within equality of resources.191 But equality of resources does not
186 Id. at 131, 137.
187 Anderson, note 77, at 288.
188 Id. at 306.
189 Id. at 309. This is consistent with Rawls' approach. See Section V.A.
190 Anderson, note 77, at 309-10.
191 My approach in this Article is consistent with my prior work in treating political
theories as constraints on the design of tax systems, rather than imposing specific require-
ments on tax design. Because institutions of society are varied and interacting, it is impos-
sible to isolate the tax system and determine whether it carries out the political theory. See
generally Sugin, note 139, at 1993 (arguing that because of the myriad rules, policies, re-
sources, markets, and educational opportunities that affect a society, a consideration of the
tax system alone is never enough to determine if a particular ideal is being met); see also
Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 8 ("Taxes must be evaluated as part of the overall system of
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stop at "equal opportunity egalitarianism" because Dworkin specifi-
cally rejects the purely ex-ante notion of equality of opportunity as the
full meaning of equality of resources.192 He rejects the "starting gate
theory of fairness," and argues that equality of resources is concerned
with maintaining equality over time, as defined by continuing satisfac-
tion of the envy test.193 Equality of resources requires regular reas-
sessment of distributive shares, which requires sensitivity to outcomes
as well as opportunities.194 This approach to distributive justice is in-
consistent with endowment taxation, which isolates ability to earn and
must fix the measure of that ability.
In addition, Dworkin's insurance scheme, which he chooses to im-
plement equality of resources, is inconsistent with an endowment tax.
The insurance scheme he describes is a progressive income tax system
that he adopts in order to "neutralize the effects of differential talents,
yet preserve the consequences of one person choosing an occupation,
in response to his sense of what he wants to do with his life, that is
more expensive for the community than the choice another makes."195
Dworkin refuses to treat a person's physical and mental powers as
part of his resources, and therefore refuses to "provide for an initial
compensation to alleviate differences," 196 which is fundamentally the
goal of an endowment tax. His refusal is based, at least in part, on
problems of substitutability and incommensurability.197
An endowment tax attempts to neutralize the effects of different
talents, but it fails to account for the costs and benefits to the commu-
nity from an individual's choices, which equality of resources also de-
mands. The relief worker, who earns little but produces great benefits
for society, should be taxed less under equality of resources than his
equal endowment counterpart who chose a different occupation be-
cause his life alleviates other costs to the community. In fact, the in-
surance/tax scheme that Dworkin chooses belies some discomfort with
the brute luck/option luck dichotomy that he initially describes be-
cause it makes the winners share with the losers even if they both took
the same calculated risks, but each turned out differently. Dworkin's
insurance/income tax is actually an ex post system.198 Thus, Dwor-
property rights that they help to create. Justice or injustice in taxation can only mean
justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a
particular tax regime.").
192 Dworkin, note 65, at 309.
193 Id. at 308-10.
194 Id. at 309-10.
195 Id. at 313.
196 Id. at 300.
197 Id. at 300-01.
198 Dworkin explicitly rejects a consumption tax or a wealth tax as a solution to the
problem of differential talents. Id. at 312 n.9.
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kin's commitment to equal opportunity at the outset is not sufficient
to complete his definition of justice. A continuing application of the
envy test requires attention to both opportunities and outcomes.
Dworkin's commitment to continued intervention in the market
over time distinguishes equality of resources from the laissez-faire
market approach taken by Nozick. Just as liberal egalitarians and lib-
ertarians differ in their understanding of liberty, they also differ in the
normative role of the market. For Nozick, the market defines justice
because his standard is purely procedural. 99 In equality of resources,
the market does not define justice, but serves justice by requiring that
individuals bear the costs of the lives that they choose as measured by
the effects of their choices on others. The market is a crucial part of
equality of resources because Dworkin defines equality in dynamic,
social terms,200 but not because an "invisible hand" achieves justice.
Dworkin's understanding of the interrelationship of endowment
and ambition makes an ability tax too simplistic a response to the
problem of unequal talents in society. By rejecting the characteriza-
tion of endowment as resources, Dworkin's theory-which defines
distributive justice as equality of resources over a life201-ultimately
cannot countenance endowment taxation. He considers whether the
insurance premium in his scheme should be based on potential in-
come, but he rejects it.20 2 He concedes that endowment and effort are
inseparable.203 Effort and talent are interdependent and inseparable
and in the end, equality of resources treats the distinction between
them as theoretically suspect. 204
Dworkin's choice of income as the tax base, rather than ability, bet-
ter accommodates the competing demands of equality in designing a
tax system. An income tax offers a compromise for Dworkin between
equal opportunity, concern for outcomes, and individual integrity. 205
It minimizes the consequences that flow from differences in talent,
while allowing those talents to take part in the dynamic process of
choosing a particular life.2 0 6 Ultimately, Dworkin's equality of re-
sources reflects discomfort with the idea that endowment can be iso-
lated, and he recognizes that ability and ambition are in a reciprocal
relationship. 207 Thus, while he is concerned that there is something
199 See Nozick, note 106, at 150-51.
2m See notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
201 Dworkin, note 65, at 309.
202 He did not fully explicate whether his objections to it are fundamental or merely
instrumental. Id. at 326.
203 Id. at 324.
2D4 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 313.
w Id. at 316.
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unfair about some people having greater abilities to earn than others,
which might push his theory to embrace an endowment tax, it is also
unfair to strip the highly-endowed of control over their individuality,
which ultimately pushes his theory away from it.208
VII. LEISURE AND WEALTH
As discussed above, 209 in the economic model, leisure includes any-
thing that prevents full use of one's endowment-low-paying work,
unpaid work, and pure recreation. But redefining leisure only as pure
recreation raises additional issues of justice that the endowment tax
debate has neglected. Limiting leisure to recreation forces considera-
tion of the fact that money is necessary to buy real leisure. People
who enjoy recreation without work can generally do so because they
have a source of money income, stored wealth, or other financial sup-
port. The leisure vs. work debate therefore leads not to a conclusion
that human capital endowment needs to be taxed, but that we may
need to reconsider the way that we tax people who inherit wealth or
receive gifts that support their lifestyle.210 The lucky housewife dis-
cussed above, 211 may need to pay tax in a just society, but it should not
be on account of her potential to earn income.
Endowment, in its colloquial sense of a store of financial capital
held by an institution that produces a stream of income for current
use, may be a more accurate measure of ability-to-pay tax than
human-capital endowment, which is subject to so many contingencies.
A post-paid consumption tax or an accessions tax may be a more
targeted way than an endowment tax to reach the nonproductive rec-
reation that an income tax or prepaid consumption tax may miss. 2 12
While it is true that gazing at the sunset would escape tax in that case,
big-ticket leisure items generally cost money, which would be taxed in
all the conventional systems. It is not necessary to tax potential earn-
ings to levy on leisure more fully than does the current system.
These thoughts about the connection between money and leisure
should make us reconsider the Mirrlees model's centrality in the tax
policy literature, and the consequent focus on labor endowment as the
most important determinant of inequality. Imagining that human-cap-
208 See id. at 307.
209 See Section III.C.
210 See generally Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively: Replacing the
Estate Tax with an Inheritance Tax, in Path to Prosperity: Hamilton Project Ideas on In-
come Security, Education, and Taxes 345, 347 (Jason Furman & Jason E. Bordoff eds.,
2008) (suggesting that an inheritance tax borne by the recipients of wealth transfers would
be a more equitable system than the estate tax).
211 See Section V.D.
212 See IRC §§ 102, 1014 (allowing significant consumption out of untaxed funds).
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ital endowment is the central issue of economic inequality in our soci-
ety is seriously flawed. 213 Financial capital is much more important
than human capital, but if endowment taxation is based on wage rates,
then there is no place to account for the effects of wealth in the tax
system. Perhaps that means that an endowment tax would be better
complemented by a wealth tax than some other forms of taxation-to
capture the inequality in human and financial capital, but I have not
seen wealth taxes presented as a component necessary to carry out the
norms underlying endowment taxation. 214 Nevertheless, if endow-
ment is important because it gives people choices in life that make
them better-off than others, how much more true that is for material
endowment than labor endowment, which needs hard work and devel-
opment by the person. 215 "Democratic equality calls into question the
very idea that inferior native endowments have much to do with ob-
served income inequalities in capitalist economies. The biggest for-
tunes are made not by those who work but by those who own the
means of production." 2 1 6 Fair taxation must recognize the sources of
social inequality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article presented a rigorous critique of the assumptions under-
lying the optimal tax model. It evaluated those assumptions from the
perspectives of both fairness and efficiency, and questioned the coher-
ence of the ideal and the power of the model to recommend desirable
tax structures. In the process of analyzing the central assumption that
an ideal tax would be based on one's ability to earn, it offered a vari-
ety of original insights about the demands of fair taxation. It argued
that fair taxation must distinguish productive from nonproductive lei-
sure, reconsider the substitutability of labor and leisure, look beyond
213 People are most likely to be rich if their parents are rich. See James R. Repetti,
Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825, 838-40 (2001). Zelenak disagrees
with my assessment of the significance of human compared to financial capital. See
Zelenak, note 21, at 1154.
214 Lily Batchelder has come closest to this by thinking about endowment in the transfer
tax context. See Batchelder, note 210, at 348-50 (asserting that her model of inheritance
taxation will take into account the heirs' ability to pay). Some proponents of consumption
taxation believe that wealth taxes are a desirable complement. See William D. Andrews,
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1118-19
(1974) (suggesting a strengthening of estate and gift taxes to reach wealth accumulation);
Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L. Rev. 423, 424-25
(2000) (arguing for a consumption tax supplemented by a "low-rate wealth tax" to replace
the income tax).
215 See Hal R. Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fair-
ness, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223, 234 (1975) (distinguishing the impracticality of valuing labor
power and the relative ease of valuing physical wealth).
216 Anderson, note 77, at 325.
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market valuation for measuring social worth, and account for luck in
addition to effort and ability. It redefined tax fairness in nonu-
tilitarian terms, where taxation is one of the institutional structures of
society designed to guarantee equal concern and respect for each indi-
vidual. It explained why libertarians and liberal egalitarians have dif-
ferent approaches to justice in taxation, clarifying some of the
confusion about nonconsequentialist theories that has plagued the tax
policy literature. Finally, it engaged in a close analysis of the ideas of
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin to illustrate the application of lib-
eral egalitarian political theory to taxation, and concluded that those
theories are not consistent with the optimal tax model's ideal tax.
Where does the analysis of fair taxation go from here? Proponents
of equal opportunity may find more promising avenues outside taxa-
tion, through educational investment or entitlement shares.217 But
even the best intervention on those terms would likely fall short of
truly equalizing opportunity. The tax system may have a greater role
to play at a later stage, where it can transfer some of the rewards from
those with greater endowments to public programs and redistribu-
tion-an after-the-fact adjustment for differences in opportunity that
could not be identified and equalized ex ante.
Rather than demanding some mechanism for equalizing potentials,
as an endowment tax would, distributive justice may be more con-
cerned about guaranteeing minimums. Murphy and Nagel endorse a
basic minimum 218 and Rawls assumes that it exists before designing
institutions. 219 The intuition that favors redistribution to individuals
with very low levels of income, wealth, or consumption may derive
from concern with whether their destitution makes them unable to
participate in civil society. In a particular social environment, some
systems of taxation may better foster participation in civil society.
In an earlier article, I argued that political theories generally do not
mandate specific systems of taxation,220 and I continue to maintain
that view. There is no one ideally just tax scheme because justice in
taxation is intertwined with market outcomes, public provision of
goods and services, and political institutions. Against the backdrop of
particular institutional arrangements, one type of tax may be clearly
superior to another. In an economic system with little inequality, a
217 See Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 4-5 (1999) (propos-
ing a grant for every citizen reaching adulthood).
218 Murphy & Nagel, note 34, at 45.
219 Robert Taylor reads Rawls to require "a degree of fulfillment of needs and material
wants" because "the [p]riority of [l]iberty would be meaningless in a society that could not
even establish the basic liberties themselves due to social and economic conditions." Tay-
lor, note 75, at 262-63.
220 See Sugin, note 139.
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significant welfare state, and developed institutions for education,
child care, and health, a tax with limited redistributive potential 221
might adequately fund economic opportunity and security for all citi-
zens. However, a society with great wealth and income inequality,
and inadequate public education, social services, and medical care
would require a more redistributive tax system as a tool of economic
justice. 222
The further a society finds itself from equality, the more work a tax
system must do to contribute to justice. The design of a just tax sys-
tem is contingent on outside factors. While there might be internal
tax norms that maintain the coherence of the system, there is no
avoiding the interaction of taxation with other social policies. Justice
in taxation must ultimately be accountable on the same terms as other
government institutions. Despite the continued allegiance of tax pol-
icy theorists to internal norms of taxation, those norms must be evalu-
ated according to the broader criteria applied to the exercise of
coercive government power.
The role of political theory in tax justice is generally contingent
since it cannot definitively mandate particular rate schedules or tax
bases, and many diverse systems of taxation would be acceptable
within most political theories. Standing alone, political theory cannot
recommend specific tax schemes, but it can operate as a trump on
schemes that arise in the political process. In my prior article, I con-
sidered the work of John Rawls, and argued that looking for a particu-
lar system of taxation required by his theory was misguided. 223
Instead, I argued that those interested in tax justice should look to
political theories for limits on acceptable forms of taxation, since dif-
ferent theories may prohibit particular systems; tax scholars need to
shift their focus from a search for requirements to identifying those
limitations. 224 The one prohibited tax scheme I identified was one
based on an individual's ability to earn. 2 2 5
221 A proportional consumption tax would be an example of such a tax. See Neal Boortz
& John Linder, The FairTax Book 75-76 (2005) (proposing abolishing the current U.S. tax
system and replacing it with a flat 23% personal consumption tax).
222 For example, given the current distribution of income and wealth combined with
existing government policies of economic regulation, one may argue that a progressive
income tax is the most just. Repetti, note 11, at 1131-32 (arguing for a tax system "de-
signed to achieve equal opportunity for self-realization" by keeping the burden on disad-
vantaged taxpayers low enough to avoid harming opportunities while keeping the burden
on advantaged taxpayers high enough to allow for the reduced burden on the
disadvantaged).
223 Sugin, note 139, at 1992-93.
224 Id. at 1993-94.
m Id. at 2006-08.
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This Article has been an attempt to comprehensively analyze that
limitation and its implications for the optimal tax model. It explains
why the intuition that most people have about ability taxation is
right-that endowment taxation is fundamentally at odds with fairness
principles. It has identified the nature of the objections to endowment
taxation more specifically than vague notions of autonomy and liberty
that have previously appeared in the literature, and has exposed some
of the underlying assumptions and biases in the discussion to date.
The arguments against endowment taxation do not necessarily map
onto arguments for another base, but the concerns analyzed here must
be part of the evaluation of any system of taxation that purports to be
just.
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